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Can Judges Make Reliable Numeric Judgments?
Distorted Damages and Skewed Sentences
JEFFREY J. RACHLINSKI, ANDREW J. WISTRICH & CHRIS GUTHRIE*

In a series of studies involving over six hundred trialjudges in three countries,
we demonstrate that trialjudges' civil damage awards and criminal sentences are
subject to influences that make them erratic. We found that the presence of
misleading numeric referencepoints (or "anchors") affected judges' decisions in a
series of hypothetical cases. Specifically, judges imposed shorter sentences when
assigning sentences in months rather than in years; awarded higher amounts of
compensatory damages when informed of a cap on damage awards; imposed
different sentences depending upon the sequence in which criminal cases were
presentedto them; andwere influenced by a plaintif's reference to a damage award
seen on a "court TV show. " Taken together, the results suggest that unless judges
take steps to reduce their susceptibility to anchors, their awards and sentences are
apt to be highly unreliable. We also suggest how judges can safeguardagainstthese
influences and assign more stable awards andsentences.
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INTRODUCTION

How many words, on average, did law review articles published in 2012 contain?
Before you answer, was it more or less than 11,432,839 words? The word count in
law reviews is high, but that is a ridiculous estimate. Even though a correct,
objectively determinable answer exists, and 11,432,839 is a ridiculously high
estimate, contemplating that ridiculously high reference point is apt to influence
estimates of the actual word count. Psychologists refer to the reliance on numeric
reference points as a means of making a numeric judgment as "anchoring and
adjustment," or simply "anchoring."' Anchoring exerts a powerful effect on

* Rachlinski is a Professor of Law at Cornell Law School; Wistrich is a Magistrate
Judge in the United States District Court for the Central District of California; Guthrie is Dean
and John Wade-Kent Syverud Professor of Law at Vanderbilt Law School.
1. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, 185 ScI. 1124, 1128 (1974) (describing anchoring).
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judgment. 2 Even though legal scholars are well aware of the length of articles, in
particular the cap of 25,000 words that many law reviews have adopted,' first
contemplating a ridiculously high anchor is apt to influence their estimates.
Estimating the average length of law review articles is just a parlor game for legal
academics, but many numeric estimates have important consequences. Numbers
abound in civil and criminal cases. Losing defendants pay money or serve time in
prison. Sometimes expressing the outcome of a case in dollars or months is a
straightforward undertaking, such as when damage awards or sentences are highly
constrained.' But judgment is often required to measure damages and impose
sentences, and cognitive illusions can systematically skew numeric outcomes.5 In
particular, such judgments are susceptible to distortions from anchoring and related
phenomena. 6 Our experiments reveal that anchoring exerts a powerful influence on
judicial decisions in hypothetical cases across a wide variety of legal contexts. We
also find that anchors can arise in subtle and unexpected ways. Our results suggest
that anchoring is so persistent, unexpected, and widespread that the process of

2. See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR

DECISIONS 23-38 (rev. & expanded ed., 2009) (describing the influence of anchoring).

3. Many law reviews now state a preference for articles under 25,000 words. See, e.g.,
Submissions: How To Submit, HARv. L. REv., http://www.harvardlawreview.org/submissions.php.
4. Criminal sentences imposed using sentencing guidelines are often tightly constrained,
as is the case with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES
MANUAL (2014). Awards for medical expenses, lost wages, or the cost of covering undelivered

consideration in contract can also be relatively uncomplicated relative to nonpecuniary losses.
See DAVID BALL, DAVID BALL ON DAMAGES:

A PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY'S GUIDE FOR

PERSONAL INJURY AND WRONGFUL DEATH CASES 27 (1st ed. 2001) ("Intangible damages are

hard to get partly because . .. jurors do not know how to figure out how much to give....
Jurors have less trouble calculating and giving tangible damages . . . [such as] medical
expenses and lost wages, and the amounts can be easily determined."); Adam G. Winters,
Comment, Where There's Smoke, Is There Fire?An EmpiricalAnalysis of the Tort "Crisis"
in Illinois, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1347, 1349-50 (2007) ("'[E]conomic' damages ... can be
loosely described as any loss that comes with a 'price tag' or is easily calculable. Losses
considered 'economic' include past lost wages due to injury and medical bills, as well as future
lost wages and medical expenses. . . . The complimentary piece of the compensatory scheme
is collectively labeled 'noneconomic' damages. These damages are more difficult to quantify,

because there is no underlying bill, record, or pay stub on which to base them. Noneconomic
losses include 'pain and suffering."' (footnotes omitted)). Some statutes specify a particular
amount of damages per violation. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) (2012) (authorizing "an

action to recover for actual monetary loss . . . or to receive $500 in damages for each such
violation, whichever is greater"); 47 U.S.C. § 551(f)(2)(A) (2012) (authorizing "actual
damages but not less than liquidated damages computed at the rate of $100 a day for each day
of violation or $1,000, whichever is higher").
5. See Valerie P. Hans, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Emily G. Owens, Editors' Introduction to
Judgment by the Numbers: Converting Qualitative to Quantitative Judgments in Law, 8 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 1-2 (2011) ("Errors in human judgment arise from

the foibles of converting a subjective or qualitative judgment into a linear and quantitative scale.").
6. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial

Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 787-94 (2001) (reporting experimental evidence showing that
judges are susceptible to the influence of anchoring in assigning damage awards).
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assigning awards and sentences might be pervasively unreliable, absent some
remedial intervention.
Although converting qualitative assessments into quantitative judgments is
challenging,7 the rule of law requires that courts make these judgments in a consistent
fashion. A criminal defendant's sentence or a civil plaintiff s damage award should
arise from the facts and applicable law.' It should not vary with the mood of the
judge, the time of day, or the case that came before it. Excessively long criminal
sentences constitute an immoral infliction of excess suffering, and overly short
9
sentences fail to reflect society's disapproval and demean the integrity of the victim.
Similarly, erratic damage awards in civil cases are unfair and suggest that the civil
justice system is a chaotic game of chance in which some aggrieved victims go
uncompensated, while others enjoy a windfall.`o
Deterrence in both civil and criminal cases also depends upon having courts
assign sentences and damage awards reliably. A rational, just society should
carefully tailor its criminal sentences to create an optimal level of deterrence."

7. See David M. Studdert, Allen Kachalia, Joshua A. Salomon & Michelle M. Mello,
Rationalizing Noneconomic Damages: A Health-Utilities Approach, LAW & CONTEMP.

PROBs., Summer 2011, at 57, 57 ("Quantifying noneconomic loss is a profound, longstanding,
and seemingly intractable problem in the civil justice system.").
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2012) (requiring the sentencing judge to consider "the
need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who
have been found guilty of similar conduct" when imposing a sentence); Marvin E. Frankel,
The Questfor Equality in Sentencing, 25 ISR. L. REV. 595, 595 (1991) ("Any system ofjustice

purporting to be civilized must pursue ... that people similarly circumstanced are to be treated
equally under the law. . .. "); Paul H. Robinson, Michael T. Cahill & Usman Mohammad, The
Five Worst (andFive Best) American CriminalCodes, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 1 (2000) (arguing

that criminal codes make the understanding and application of laws easier as well as increase
the uniformity of applying the law).
9.

See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 71 (1976)

("The offender ... is being treated as though he deserves the unpleasantness that is being
inflicted on him. That being the case, it should be inflicted only to the degree that it is
deserved." (emphasis omitted)); Norval Morris, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Address at the
University of Denver College of Law: Punishment, Desert and Rehabilitation 22 (Nov. 12,
1976) ("The concept of desert defines relationships between crimes and punishments on a
continuum between the unduly lenient and the excessively punitive within which the just
sentence may on other grounds be determined.").
10. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 8 (1973)

(asserting that disparities in sentencing violate horizontal equity and undermine public
confidence); CASS R. SuNsTEIN, REID HASTIE, JOHN W. PAYNE, DAVID A. SCHKADE & W. KIP
ViscusI, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE 3 (2002) ("Our society is deeply conunitted

to employing the force of government with reason and consistency. Discrepant punishments
for the same act ... are inconsistent with that commitment."); Randall R. Bovbjerg, Frank A.
Sloan & James F. Blumstein, Valuing Life andLimb in Tort: Scheduling "PainandSuffering,"

83 Nw. U. L. REv. 908, 924 (1989) ("[F]undamental fairness requires similarly situated parties
to be treated in a similar fashion by the legal system." (emphasis omitted)); Studdert et al.,
supra note 7, at 59 ("Whatever the explanations, the heterogeneity in noneconomic-damages
awards among injuries of similar severity is inefficient, inequitable, and has damaging
consequences for the legitimacy of personal-injury compensation systems.").
11. See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:An Economic Approach, 76 J.
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Sentences that are too long impose unnecessary costs on society and offenders, while
sentences that are too short fail to deter crime effectively. Likewise, inadequate civil
damage awards fail to deter socially undesirable conduct, while awards that are too
high needlessly deter socially useful activities.12
Imperfection is, of course, inherent in any legal system. Studies from a wide
variety of contexts suggest that litigants' characteristics, such as their race' or
gender,1 4 influence criminal sentences and damage awards. So does the political
orientation of the judge.' Moreover, some tasks-notably, assessing some elements
of civil damage awards-might be so indeterminate that judges lack the kind of
meaningful guidance that would facilitate reliable judgments.' 6 These sources of
legal indeterminacy, while unfortunate, are at least understood as unwanted parts of
an unavoidably imperfect system." Extraneous influences, such as the type of

POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
12. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE EcoNoMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW 10 (1987).
13. See, e.g., David S. Abrams, Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Do Judges
Vary in Their Treatment of Race?, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 347, 350 (2012) (describing a study
demonstrating racial disparities in sentencing); Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically
Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S.

CAL.

L. REV.

1103, 1159 (2004) (reviewing research indicating that the way individuals view race will cause
them to judge the behavior of people differently, even if the behavior being judged is the same).
14. See, e.g., Amy Farrell, Geoff Ward & Danielle Rousseau, Intersectionsof Genderand
Race in Federal Sentencing: Examining Court Contexts and the Effects of Representative

Court Authorities, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 85, 91 (2010) (finding that the leniency that
women experience may be attributable to criminal justice system authorities viewing women
as less dangerous and believing that women "possess a generally greater potential for reform
than men"); Ilene H. Nagel & Barry L. Johnson, The Role of Gender in a StructuredSentencing
System: Equal Treatment, Policy Choices, and the Sentencing of Female Offenders Under the
United States Sentencing Guidelines, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 181, 186 (1994) ("Women

are more likely than similarly situated men to receive suspended sentences or probation.").
15. Research assessing the influence of judges' political preferences is extensive. See
generally, e.g., CASS R.

SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA

M.

ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI,

ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY

(2006); William

M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational JudicialBehavior: A Statistical Study, 1 J.

LEGAL

ANALYSIS 775 (2009); Jeffrey A. Segal, Lee Epstein, Charles M. Cameron & Harold J. Spaeth,
IdeologicalValues andthe Votes of US. Supreme CourtJusticesRevisited, 57 J. POL. 812 (1995).

16. See David Baldus, John C. MacQueen & George Woodworth, Improving Judicial
Oversight ofJury DamagesAssessments: A Proposalfor the ComparativeAdditur/Remittitur
Review of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 IOWA L. REv. 1109,

1182 (1995) ("[T]here is no 'correct' general damages award for any nonpecuniary harm.");
William Zelermyer, Damagesfor Pain and Suffering, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV. 27, 28 (1954)
("[P]ain and suffering have no dimensions, mathematical or financial. Whatever claim or
award is based upon these intangibles must, therefore, be conceived at the end of a speculative
and uncertain journey.").

17. See McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E. 2d 372, 374-75 (N.Y. 1989) ("[R]ecovery for
nonecomonic losses such as pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life rests on 'the legal
fiction that money damages can compensate for a victim's injury.' We accept this fiction,
knowing that although money will neither ease the pain nor restore the victim's abilities, this
device is as close as the law can come in its effort to right the wrong. We have no hope of
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defendant or the political attitude of the judge, can be thought of as measurement
error in the legal system. Judges and juries use different yardsticks to measure the
harm done to women as opposed to men' 8 or to assess the appropriate punishment
assigned to defendants of different races.' 9 Variability among judges is an unfortunate
but unavoidable aspect of the nature of justice dispensed by human beings. Some
judges, by their nature, will impose more severe sentences than their colleagues.2 o Even
with intricate sentencing guidelines, detailed sentencing reports prepared by probation
officers, and lengthy arguments by attorneys, some judicial discretion will remain to
be exercised differently by judges of different predilections.2
Invidious biases toward litigants, the influence of political orientation ofjudges, and
case complexity, however, are all such widely acknowledged impediments to
consistent adjudication that society attempts to reduce these influences in several ways.
Codes ofjudicial ethics require judges to avoid judgments based on race or gender, and
case law requires judges to avoid even the appearance of such improprieties.22 The
judicial appointment process also addresses concerns regarding the appointment of
judges deemed to be overly partisan. 23 Judges in many jurisdictions also face elections,
which are another source of accountability.24 In criminal cases, sentencing guidelines
constrain sentences, thereby limiting the degree to which erratic judgment might
adversely affect outcomes. 25

evaluating what has been lost, but a monetary award may provide a measure of solace for the
condition created." (citations omitted)).
18. See, e.g., Jane Goodman, Elizabeth F. Loftus, Marian Miller & Edith Greene, Money,
Sex, andDeath: GenderBias in Wrongful Death DamageAwards, 25

LAw

& Soc'Y REv. 263,

281 (1991) (reporting experimental evidence that jurors award more in wrongful death suits
involving male victims than female victims).
19. See David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing:
Evidencefrom the U.S. FederalCourts, 44 J.L. & EcoN. 285, 311-12 (2001) (reporting a large

racial disparity in sentences imposed under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Does Unconscious
RacialBias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1195, 1221-26 (2009) (concluding
that implicit racial biases affect judges' sentences).
20. See William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of CriminalLaw, 100 MICH. L.

REV.

505, 527 (2001) (explaining that judges have their own beliefs about particular crimes and how
broadly they should be defined, which affects how statutes are interpreted and enforced).
21. See id. at 529 (finding that "[i]deological differences, public-interested goals, [and]
the reigning institutional culture" can affect or even dominate the behavior of judges).
22. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.3(B) (2011) ("A judge shall not,
in the performance ofjudicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, or engage
in harassment, including but not limited to bias, prejudice, or harassment based upon race, sex,
gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status,
socioeconomic status, or political affiliation . . . .").
23. For a recent discussion of this concern, see generally JOHN R. Lorr, JR., DUMBING
DOWN THE COURTS: How POLITICS KEEPS THE SMARTEST JUDGES OFF THE BENCH (2013).
24. See Joanna Shepherd, Measuring Maximizing Judges: Empirical Legal Studies,
Public Choice Theory, and Judicial Behavior, 2011 U. ILL. L. REv. 1753, 1760 tbl.1

(documenting the various state judicial selection and retention procedures).
25. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366 (1989) (noting that the federal
sentencing guidelines were intended to remedy two "unjustifi[ed]" and "shameful"
deficiencies in the previous sentencing regime, the first of which was "the great variation

700

INDIANA LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 90:695

Efforts to identify and root out systematic deviations in sentences and awards,
however, presuppose that if judges all could be induced to measure desert and harm
the same way across litigants of different races and genders, then reliability would
emerge. This understanding of the criminal and civil justice systems can thus be
likened to measurement error in intelligence testing. Test theory suggests that there
exists a correct IQ score for any individual,2 6 but it acknowledges that individual test
performance will vary based on mood and mistake and that biases exist in tests
themselves that unreasonably influence how people from different races perform.27
But underlying test theory is a faith that there exists a true IQ score and that the
results of any one test will measure this true score, along with some error variance.2 8
This is precisely the model underlying the criminal and civil justice systems. For
every offender and every injured plaintiff, there exists a correct sentence and a
correct award. Each case produces this correct sentence and award, along with some
degree of error variance. As long as the error component is small and not systematic,
it can be tolerable. We suspect, however, that the cognitive processes that underlie
numeric judgments in court face a more fundamental problem than measurement
error. We argue that numeric judgments are constructed in a case-by-case fashion
and thus cannot be made consistent simply by inducing judges to ignore invidious
factors and harmonizing judges' political and social values.
Our thesis that damage awards and sentences are constructed in an ad hoc fashion
arises from a contemporary understanding of human judgment and decision making.
Psychologists who study judgment and choice argue that judgments are constructed
in context.29 When people estimate what they would be willing to pay for a new home
or an iPad, they are not mentally downloading a preexisting, fixed assessment of the
value of these commodities; rather, they are creating a set of preferences that are a
product of a specific context. This is not to say that the price they are willing to pay
is wholly arbitrary. People recognize that a 3500-square-foot home in a nice
neighborhood is more valuable than an iPad. The value of the items affects people's
mental constructions, but the process is fundamentally one of mental creation rather
than measurement. Judgments thus have an arbitrary coherence. 30 The amount a
customer is willing to pay for a consumer good arises from the customer's mood, other
decisions she may have recently made, and a wide range of ephemeral influences. 31

among sentences imposed by different judges upon similarly situated offenders" (alteration in
original) (citation omitted)).
26. See Timo M. Bechger, Gunter Maris, Huub H. F. M. Verstralen & Anton A. B6guin,
Using Classical Test Theory in Combination with Item Response Theory, 27 APPLIED
PSYCHOL. MEASUREMENT 319,320 (2003).

27. See generally Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape
Intellectual Identity and Performance, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 613 (1997) (describing how
stereotypes associated with race and gender affect test scores).
28. See Bechger et al., supra note 26, at 329.

29. See Dan Simon, Daniel C. Krawczyk, Airom Bleicher &Keith J. Holyoak, The Transience
of ConstructedPreferences, 21 J. BEHAv. DECISION MAKING 1, 1 (2008) ("A substantial body of
literature on judgment and decision-making has been devoted to the construction of preferences....
It has been suggested that preferences are invented rather than found.").
30. See ARIELY, supra note 2, at 26 (describing "arbitrary coherence" in preferences).
31. See Sarah Lichtenstein & Paul Slovic, The Construction ofPreference:An Overview,
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We suspect that judgments made in the legal system are no different than
judgments made in other parts of life.32 Judges certainly understand that a murderer
deserves a more severe sentence than a shoplifter. But the exact sentence imposed
will likely reflect contextual factors and an inherent underlying arbitrariness.
Invidious biases, political influences, and simple indeterminacy are thus just the most
visible symptoms of a more widespread problem in the legal system. Judges, like
most people, lack the cognitive capacity to make reliable quantitative judgments in
a complex environment. They can adopt mechanisms to produce a degree of
reliability, but their judgments are inherently erratic. Recognizing this endemic
characteristic of quantitative judgments provides a more solid footing for efforts to
provide regularity to judgments.
I. EVIDENCE OF ARBITRARINESS: ANCHORING AND SCALING

Among the phenomena that demonstrate the arbitrary nature of choice, anchoring
stands out as particularly significant. Anchoring refers to the tendency to rely on
numeric reference points to make numeric judgments, even when such estimates are
arbitrary, irrelevant, or ludicrous. 33 The pervasive influence of anchoring reveals
such a strong and systematic tendency to attend to decisional context, regardless of
whether it is misleading, that it is prime evidence of an underlying arbitrariness in
human numeric judgment.3 4
The initial studies of anchoring identified the phenomenon as a somewhat
innocuous example of the role that simple mental strategies play in judgment.35
Tversky and Kahneman first demonstrated the influence of anchors on numeric
judgments by asking undergraduates to estimate the percentage of countries in the
United Nations that are African after giving them a transparently arbitrary reference
point.36 Subjects were asked to spin a roulette-style wheel that was rigged to land on
65 or 20. When the wheel landed on 65, subjects provided much higher estimates
than when it landed on 20. The researchers also demonstrated that when asked to
estimate the product of 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 x 6 x 7 x 8, people provided lower estimates
than when asked to estimate the product of 8 x 7 x 6 x 5 x 4 x 3 x 2 x 1.3
Tversky and Kahneman cited anchoring as one of a set of simple mental shortcuts
(or heuristics) that people use to make judgments." They asserted that these shortcuts

in THE CONSTRUCTION OF PREFERENCE 1, 2 (Sarah Lichtenstein & Paul Slovic eds., 2006)

("The variability in the ways we construct and reconstruct our preferences yields preferences
that are labile, inconsistent, subject to factors we are unaware of, and not always in our own
best interests.").
32. See generallyChris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on
the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (2007) (presenting evidence that

judges use the same kinds of decision-making strategies as most adults).
33. See Scorr PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AN) DECISION MAKING 146 (1993).

34.
35.
mental
36.
37.
38.

See ARIELY, supranote 2, at 33-36 (describing the influence of anchoring on judgment).
See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 1 (identifying anchoring as one of a set of
strategies people use to make decisions).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1128-32.
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are useful but can lead to mistakes in judgment." Anchoring is often a sensible
strategy for numeric assessment because anchors are commonly reasonable first
approximations. For example, consumers know that they are not apt to pay the sticker
price listed on a new automobile; rather, they will pay some amount less than this,
depending upon their negotiation skills, the dealer's disposition to make the sale, and
various other factors. The sticker price, however, is a good initial estimate of the final
price. Tversky and Kahneman argued that when the subjects in their studies relied
on the random starting point, they were overusing a good strategy for making
numeric judgments and failing to put enough cognitive effort into adjusting the initial
40
reference point toward the correct estimate.
This account of anchoring as a useful heuristic that gets overused suggests that
people are making fundamentally sound judgments, although these judgments get
distorted. But the account does not explain why people fail to recognize how
dangerous this heuristic is in situations in which the anchor is obviously irrelevant.
In one study, researchers had undergraduate subjects write down the last three digits
of their phone number and add 400 to it. The researchers then asked the subjects
whether Attila the Hun was defeated in Europe before or after that year. 4' After
obtaining that answer, the researchers asked in what year Attila was defeated. The
subjects knew perfectly well that their phone numbers had nothing to do with
European history, but their final estimates of the year that Attila was defeated
nevertheless correlated with their phone numbers. In another study, researchers asked
undergraduates to identify the average price of a textbook in the campus bookstore. 4 2
For half of the participants, the researchers first asked whether the price was greater
or less than $7163.52. When subjects first had to contemplate that absurd estimate,
they provided higher estimates than those who had not been exposed to it.
Anchoring has proven to be a robust phenomenon that affects all manner of
judgments.4 3 In one study, a price provided by an admittedly uninformed person
altered subjects' estimates of the value of used automobiles." In another, the number
on a football player's uniform altered estimates of the likelihood that that player

39. Id. at 1124 ("In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to
severe and systematic errors.").
40. Id. at 1128 (noting that adjustments from initial starting points are typically insufficient).
41. J. EDWARD Russo & PAUL J.H. SCHOEMAKER, DECISION TRAPs: TEN BARRIERS TO
BRILLIANT DECISION-MAKING AND How TO OVERCOME THEM 90 (1989).

42. PLous, supranote 33, at 146.
43. See Gretchen B. Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, Anchoring, Activation, and the
Construction of Values, 79 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUm. DECISION PROCESSES 115, 117
(1999) ("Demonstration of the anchoring effect are [sic] plentiful in studies of judgment.");
Nicholas Epley & Thomas Gilovich, PuttingAdjustment Back in the Anchoring and Adjustment
Heuristic: DiferentialProcessing of Self-Generatedand Experimenter-ProvidedAnchors, 12
PSYCHOL. SCI. 391, 391 (2001) ("Countless experiments have shown that people's absolute
answers are influenced by the initial comparison with the irrelevant anchor."); Adrian Furnham
& Hua Chu Boo, A LiteratureReview of the Anchoring Effect, 40 J. Socio-ECoNoMICs 35, 41
(2011) ("There is now nearly 40 years' worth of research on the anchoring effect which has
proved to be extremely robust.").

44. Thomas Mussweiler, Fritz Strack & Tim Pfeiffer, Overcoming the Inevitable
Anchoring Effect: Considering the Opposite Compensates for Selective Accessibility, 26
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1142, 1144-47 (2000).
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would sack the opposing quarterback in an upcoming playoff game."5 Researchers
found that people asked to predict the likelihood that the United States would deploy
military troops to address the conflict in Yugoslavia gave lower estimates when they
were first asked whether that likelihood was greater or less than 30% as opposed to
70%.46 When people estimated the freezing point of vodka, they tended to start with
32 degrees (the freezing point of water) and adjust insufficiently downward.47 When
asked to estimate George Washington's age when he died, people fixated on
randomly generated numbers that were either too high or too low.48 The starting point
in negotiations also anchors the final outcome, even when the starting point is not
meaningful.49 Research on anchoring has also demonstrated that the phenomenon
influences estimates of not only what goods might cost but also how much people
are actually willing to pay.s0
But what accounts for the influence of anchors? At its core, anchoring is a
demonstration that people construct numeric judgment from the surrounding
context-even when that context is misleading and irrelevant." Researchers have
identified three cognitive processes that allow irrelevant anchors to influence
judgment: cognitive laziness, availability, and scale distortion.52
First, Tversky and Kahneman initially described anchoring as a consequence of
cognitive laziness.5 3 They maintained that cognitive effort is required to mentally
adjust away from the initial anchor to the final estimate. This account supposes that
in making numeric estimates, people mentally move their estimates to match the
evidence that they have available for their understanding of the world. People

45. Clayton R. Critcher & Thomas Gilovich, Incidental Environmental Anchors, 21 J.

241, 243-45 (2008).
46. Chapman & Johnson, supra note 43, at 133-35.
47. Epley & Gilovich, supra note 43, at 395.
48. Kevin L. Blankenship, Duane T. Wegener, Richard E. Petty, Brian Detweiler-Bedell

BEHAV. DECISION MAKING

& Cheryl L. Macy, Elaboration and Consequences of Anchored Estimates: An Attitudinal
Perspectiveon NumericalAnchoring, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 1465, 1467-69 (2008).
49. See generally, e.g., Adam D. Galinsky & Thomas Mussweiler, First Offers as
Anchors: The Role of Perspective-Takingand Negotiator Focus, 81 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 657 (2001); Greg Pogarsky & Linda Babcock, Damage Caps, MotivatedAnchoring,
andBargainingImpasse, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 143 (2001).

50. See ARIELY, supra note 2, at 27-31 (describing auctions for actual items in which bids
correlated with transparently random starting points such as digits in Social Security numbers).
51. See Chapman & Johnson, supra note 43, at 116 ("The effect of anchors is one
indication that many statements of value and belief are not directly retrieved from memory but
rather are constructed online in response to a query.").
52. But see Dan Orr & Chris Guthrie, Anchoring, Information, Expertise, and
Negotiation: New Insightsfrom Meta-Analysis, 21 OHIo ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 597, 601-05

(2006) (describing the "four theoretical accounts of anchoring: (1) the social implications
theory; (2) the insufficient adjustment theory; (3) the numeric priming theory; and (4) the
information salience theory"). We do not treat the "social implications theory" in our account,
as it appears to us either to overlap with other theories or to be the product of motivated
reasoning rather than a purely cognitive strategy.
53. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 1, at 1128 (describing anchoring as arising from
"insufficient adjustment" from a reference point).
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commonly fail to put enough effort into the adjustment process, so the initial anchor
exerts too much influence over the final judgment.54
A second, competing account of anchoring relies on cognitive availability. This
model arose from the concern that adjustment cannot truly account for the range of
influence anchors have."s Researchers have proposed that anchors affect the focus of
people's attention and consequently affect their judgment. 6 In rejecting ludicrous
anchors, people call to mind the most extreme example that they can imagine.5
When asked to estimate the average price of a college textbook, for example, the
absurdly high anchor leads people to recall highly expensive books. When they
recognize that even the most expensive textbooks are far below the absurd anchor,
they can reject the hypothesis that the average book is truly that costly. But when
they then estimate the actual average price, they are thinking about expensive books,
which produces higher estimates.5 8
The availability model of anchoring, however, fails to explain some of the more
bizarre aspects of anchoring. Some of the studies involve anchoring in contexts where
availability seems like an implausible explanation." For example, studies in which
anchoring influences estimates involving historic events (such as the year George
Washington was elected President) or scientific values (such as the freezing point of
vodka) in which people rely on reference points that they know are inaccurate (1776,
and 32 degrees Fahrenheit) do not seem to involve cognitive availability.60
Furthermore, studies that do not require subjects to reject extreme hypotheses also
facilitate anchoring. Shane Frederick and Daniel Mochon demonstrated, for example,
that independent serial estimates create anchors. 61 In one of their studies, subjects who
first estimated the average weight of an adult male raccoon and then an adult male
giraffe gave lower estimates for the giraffe than when they were asked to estimate the
weights in the reverse order. 62 The estimates for the weight of the raccoon were

54. See generally Epley & Gilovich, supra note 43 (arguing that anchoring arises from
insufficient adjustment).
55. See Fritz Strack & Thomas Mussweiler, Explaining the EnigmaticAnchoring Effect:
Mechanisms of Selective Accessibility, 73 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 437, 437-38
(1997) (identifying problems with the adjustment theory of anchoring).
56. See Chapman & Johnson, supra note 43, at 119 ("[R]ecent anchoring accounts
propose that the anchor makes information that is consistent with the anchor more available.").
57. See Thomas Mussweiler & Fritz Strack, The Use of Category and Exemplar
Knowledge in the Solution of Anchoring Tasks, 78 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1038,

1040 (2000) ("[A] comparative anchoring task that includes an implausible anchor value is
likely to be solved on the basis of category knowledge about the target."); Strack
& Mussweiler, supra note 55, at 444 (describing anchoring as arising from internal testing of
the anchor as an initial hypothesis).
58. See Mussweiler & Strack, supra note 57, at 1040 (describing the selective-accessibility
model of anchoring).
59. See, e.g., Epley & Gilovich, supra note 43, at 391 (Some anchors "are known-from
the beginning-to be wrong. There is thus no cause to consider whether the anchor value is
correct and thus no engine of heightened accessibility of anchor-consistent information.").
60. See id.
61. Shane W. Frederick & Daniel Mochon, A Scale Distortion Theory ofAnchoring, 141
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 124 (2012).

62. Id. at 127-28.
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likewise higher when subjects estimated the weight of the giraffe first." In effect, their
estimates influenced each other, even though the subjects must have known that the
estimates should have been independent because there was no basis for starting with
the other animal's weight as a reference point. The results are hard to square with either
the cognitive laziness or availability accounts of anchoring.
Concerned that neither cognitive laziness nor availability can fully account for
anchoring, Frederick and Mochon offer a third account. They propose that anchoring
consists of a temporary distortion in the process of translating a quantitative sense of
some physical property into a quantitative assessment.' When people struggle to
decide whether a raccoon weighs 20 pounds, 1700 pounds (the right answer for a
giraffe) seems like an extraordinarily great weight for an animal. Likewise, to a
subject who concludes that 1700 pounds is right for the giraffe, 20 pounds seems like
a paltry weight for an animal.
Frederick and Mochon's account of anchoring reveals not only how potent the
effect is but also where the source of arbitrariness leaks into judgment. They
demonstrate that anchors do not distort one's sense of the underlying object in other
ways (as the availability account suggests)." When they ask questions about animals
other than their weight that nevertheless relate to the animal's size, they find no
distortion. For example, people's estimates of the average height of a giraffe do not
change depending upon whether they are asked to make their estimates before or
after they were asked about the weight of a raccoon or how many lions a giraffe
carcass would feed. Even their sense of weight on a different scale does not change.
Subjects asked to estimate how many grand pianos would balance with an average
adult male giraffe are not influenced by previous estimates of the weight of raccoons
in pounds either. Therefore, a low anchor generated by contemplating the weight of
a small animal does not distort people's sense of how big a giraffe is, but it does
influence how people translate that sense into pounds.
Whatever the explanation for anchoring, it is a powerful phenomenon. Real estate
agents' estimates of the sale price of homes are heavily influenced by meaningless
variations in the initial listing price." The auction prices that University of Chicago
business students are willing to submit for real commodities are influenced by first
asking them whether they would be willing to pay more or less than part of their
phone number." The distortion suggests that when people identify the value they
would be willing to pay for an item, they might have a good sense of what the item
is but no stable way of converting that sense into a price. It is no wonder that retailers
use ridiculously high initial prices for retail clothing and then offer items on sale at
50% or 70% off that meaningless initial price. People understand what the item is
but do not have coherent ways of converting this understanding into a dollar amount.

63. Id. at 124-26 (presenting a "scale distortion" theory of anchoring).
64. Id. at 124 ("[T]he perceived magnitude of a number is affected by other numeric
values on that scale with which it is compared.").

65. Id. at 126-29 (describing experimental results supporting the scale distortion theory
of anchoring).
66. See, e.g., Gregory B. Northcraft & Margaret A. Neale, Experts, Amateurs, and Real
Estate: An Anchoring-and-Adjustment Perspective on Property Pricing Decisions, 39
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HuM. DECISION PROCESSES 84, 89-91 (1987).
67. ARIELY, supra note 2, at 27-31.
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II. ANCHORING AND JUDGES

Anchoring can influence a wide variety of judgments in legal contexts, 6 8

especially civil damage awards and criminal sentences. Researchers have conducted
numerous studies in mock-jury settings documenting a marked effect of anchors on
damage-award estimates provided by lay adults."9 In one such study, researchers
gave ordinary adults a description of a personal injury case and asked them for an
appropriate damage award."o The researchers varied the plaintiff s attorney's request
for a specific damage award. The plaintiff either asked for no specific amount, for
$20,000, for $5 million, or for $1 billion. Even though the range of requests was
ridiculous, "[a]s the anchor amount increased, compensation increased."" As the title
of that article suggests, "the more you ask for, the more you get." Although other
research suggests that an excessive request might backfire,7 2 numerous mock-jury
studies document a persistent influence of damage award requests on damage awards. 3
Judges might or might not be as susceptible to anchoring as nonjudges. Anchoring
distorts judgment in so many contexts that it seems likely to influence the kinds of
numeric judgments judges must make. In a recent article, Judge Mark Bennett
identified the influence of anchoring on judges as a major concern.74 Two studies of
actual sentencing decisions indicate that judges have difficulty translating their
qualitative sense of desert into numerical sentences; in particular, they fixate on
certain numbers.7" Even the Supreme Court has cited the power of authoritative

68. See generally Yuval Feldman, Amos Schurr & Doron Teichman, Anchoring Legal
Standards (Mar. 12, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), availableat http://papers.ssm.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2408193.
69. See generally, e.g., Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H. Bornstein, The More You Ask
for, the More You Get: Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 519 (1996); Reid Hastie, David A. Schkade & John W. Payne, JurorJudgments in
Civil Cases: Effects of Plaintiffs Requests and Plaintrys Identity on Punitive Damage
Awards, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 445 (1999); Verlin B. Hinsz & Kristin E. Indahl,
Assimilation to Anchors for Damage Awards in a Mock Civil Trial, 25 J. APPLIED Soc.
PSYCHOL. 991 (1995); John Malouff & Nicola S. Schutte, Shaping JurorAttitudes: Effects of
Requesting Different Damage Amounts in PersonalInjury Trials, 129 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 491
(2001); Barry Markovsky, Anchoring Justice, 51 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 213 (1988) (presenting
experimental evidence on the influence of anchoring in a variety of legal contexts, including
fairness judgments and criminal sentences)Mollie W. Marti & Roselle L. Wissler, Be Careful
What You Ask For: The Effect of Anchors on Personal Injury Damages Awards, 6 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 91 (2000); Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Christina A.
Studebaker, Anchoring in the Courtroom: The Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages, 23 LAW
& HuM. BEHAV. 353 (1999).
70. Chapman & Bornstein, supra note 69.
71. Id. at 526.
72. Marti & Wissler, supra note 69, at 92.
73. See supra note 69.
74. Mark Bennett, Confronting Cognitive "Anchor Effect" and "Blind Spot" Biases in
FederalSentencing: A Modest Solution for Reforming a FundamentalFlaw, 104 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 489, 503-13 (2014).
75. Craig Jones & Micah B. Rankin, Justice as a Rounding Error? Evidence of
Subconscious Bias in Second-Degree Murder Sentences in Canada, 52 OSGOODE HALL L.J.
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anchors in holding that criminal defendants must be sentenced under extant
sentencing guidelines-even though such guidelines are not binding. 76
On the other hand, judges' training or experience might give them an advantage.
Experience reduces (but does not eliminate) the influence of anchoring.n Forcing
decision makers to explain their choices-as judges frequently must do-also
reduces the influence of anchors.78 One study that directly compares punitive damage
awards of judges and juries demonstrates that jury awards are more erratic than
judicial awards. 79 Selecting damage awards and criminal sentences is deadly serious
business for judges, and they doubtless put a great deal of effort into the task. But
imposing awards and sentences requires the same basic cognitive task seen in the
studies of anchoring. Therefore, judges might exhibit the same kinds of difficulties
setting awards and sentences reliably as subjects in the research on anchoring.
A series of previous studies suggests that anchoring has a powerful influence on
judicial decision making. In one experiment, we asked federal magistrate judges to
identify an appropriate damage award in a hypothetical personal injury lawsuit.so The
materials indicated that the plaintiff was badly injured in an accident with the
defendant's delivery truck. The defendant had admitted to liability, and the only
remaining issue was damages. After describing the injury briefly, we asked half of
the judges to identify an appropriate damage award. We asked the same question of
the other half, but only after asking them to first rule on a motion to dismiss the case
for failing to satisfy the minimum amount in controversy for jurisdiction in federal
court-$75,000. Virtually all who were asked to decide the motion denied it, but
those who ruled on the motion also awarded the plaintiff less money than those in
the control group. The judges who had not ruled on the motion awarded an average
of $1,249,000, whereas judges who first denied the motion to dismiss awarded an
average of $882,000." Even though the motion was frivolous, it injected the low

(forthcoming 2015); Andrew Wiseman, Daniel Fischer & Michael Connelly, Sentencing and
ConventionalNumber: Preferences:A ResearchNote, 8 JUST. RES. & POL'Y 67 (2006).

76. Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2084 (2013) ("The federal system adopts
procedural measures intended to make the Guidelines the lodestone of sentencing. A
retrospective increase in the Guidelines range applicable to a defendant creates a sufficient
risk of a higher sentence to constitute an ex postfacto violation." (emphasis in original)).
77. See generally Thomas Mussweiler & Fritz Strack, Numeric Judgments Under
Certainty: The Role of Knowledge in Anchoring, 36 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 495

(2000); Andrew R. Smith, Paul D. Windschitl & Kathryn Bruchmann, Knowledge Matters:
Anchoring Effects Are Moderated by Knowledge Level, 43 EUR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 97 (2013).

78. See Philip E. Tetlock & Richard Boettger, Accountability: A Social Magnifier of the
Dilution Effect, 57 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 388, 388 (1989). But see Chris Guthrie,
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, The "Hidden Judiciary": An Empirical
Examination ofExecutive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1505-06 (2009) (finding that
asking judges to explain their decisions did not ameliorate the effect of an irrelevant anchor
on judges' damage awards).
79. Theodore Eisenberg, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Martin T. Wells, Reconciling
Experimental Incoherence with Real-World Coherence in Punitive Damages, 54 STAN. L.

REv. 1239, 1252-56 (2002).
80. Guthrie et al., supra note 6, at 790-94.
81. Id. at 791.
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anchor into the judges' thinking and thereby influenced their assessment of the
appropriate award.
In a second experiment with similar materials, we found that judges attend to
anchors that they are explicitly supposed to ignore. 2 We used the same basic
description of the severely injured plaintiff we employed in the first study, again
asserting that the defendant had admitted to liability, and the only remaining issue
was setting an appropriate damage award." We also told the judges to imagine that
they had presided over a settlement conference between the parties. In one variant of
this study, the materials either informed the judges that the plaintiff had been willing
to settle for $175,000 or stated no amount. Judges who learned of the low demand
provided lower awards than the judges who did not.84 In another version, the
materials either informed the judges that the plaintiff would not accept less than $10
million or stated no amount. Judges who learned of the high demand provided higher
awards than judges who did not.15 In all cases, the materials reiterated the evidentiary
rule prohibiting the use of any information disclosed during settlement conferences
in trials. Anchoring seemed to triumph over this injunction.
We have found that anchoring not only leads judges to ignore the rules of evidence
but also leads them to ignore the Supreme Court of the United States. In a third study,
we gave bankruptcy judges a hypothetical case involving a financial restructuring
known as a "cramdown".86 The case required each bankruptcy judge to adjust the
interest rate of a loan secured by an independent trucker's rig. Governing law
required that the court set the interest rate at the prevailing prime rate, adjusted
upwards to reflect the risk of nonpayment. We reminded the judges that the Supreme
Court had recently insisted that the original interest rate on the loan was not a relevant
consideration." The judges ignored the Court's command, however. Judges who
learned that the initial rate was 21% provided a higher rate than judges who were not
told of this amount.8 8

In a fourth study of anchors, we found that even bizarre testimony can produce a
numeric anchor that influences judgment. 89 In this study, we asked administrative
law judges attending a national conference to assess a damage award for the plaintiff
in an employment discrimination suit. The materials identified the plaintiff as a
Mexican-American administrative assistant with an excellent employment record. A
new supervisor began calling her racial epithets in front of her coworkers-and her
daughter, in one instance. When she complained, he fired her. The materials
indicated that she brought suit through a city human rights commission, but because
she found another position right away, her damages were limited to "mental anguish"
for the wrongful termination. For half of the judges, the plaintiff indicated that she

82. Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore
Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
1251, 1277-93 (2005).
83. Id. at 1288.
84. Id. at 1289.
85. Id. at 1290.

86. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Bankruptcy
Judge's Mind, 86 B.U. L. REv. 1227, 1233-37 (2006).
87. See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004).
88. Rachlinski et al., supra note 86, at 1235.
89. Guthrie et al., supra note 78, at 1501-06.
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had recently seen a "court TV show" in which a similar plaintiff was awarded
compensatory damages for mental anguish.90 The other half of the judges saw the
same testimony but were told that the claimant in the TV show had received a
compensatory damage award of $415,300. This anchor had a huge effect on the
judges: those who did not see the anchor awarded a median of $6,250, while those
who saw it awarded a median of $50,000.91
An experiment conducted in Germany also showed that judges are vulnerable to
anchoring when setting criminal sentences. 92 The researchers asked judges to impose
a sentence for a hypothetical defendant convicted of robbery. The judges first rolled
two dice and then were asked whether the sentence should be higher or lower than
the total. Just as undergraduates' phone numbers influenced their estimates of the
year of Attila the Hun's defeat, the roll of the dice influenced judges' estimates of an
appropriate criminal sentence.9 3 A similar study by two of the same researchers also
showed that suggestions from both prosecutors and defense attorneys influenced
judges' sentences in a hypothetical case.94
Are anchors as powerful in real cases as they are in the laboratory?95 Archival
data are harder to assess because it is difficult to control for unobserved variables.
Attorneys doubtless ask for more money when the underlying damages are more
serious. But what research exists suggests that anchoring influences both damage
awards and criminal sentences. A study of both judges and jurors in state courts, for
example, showed that economic damages and noneconomic damages are highly
correlated, suggesting that they anchor each other.96 Another paper showed that the
recommendations of probation officers appear to anchor judges' sentences." A study

90. Id. at 1528.
91. Id. at 1504.
92. Birte Englich, Thomas Mussweiler & Fritz Strack, Playing Dice with Criminal
Sentences: The Influence of Irrelevant Anchors on Experts' Judicial Decision Making, 32
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 188, 194-96 (2006).
93. See Russo & SCHOEMAKER, supra note 41, at 90 (describing the study involving Attila
the Hun).
94. Birte Englich & Thomas Mussweiler, Sentencing Under Uncertainty: Anchoring
Effects in the Courtroom, 31 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 1535, 1547 (2001).
95. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary R. Rose, Beth Murphy & John Meixner,
DamageAnchors on Real Juries, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 148, 173, 178 (2011) (analyzing
videotapes of actual jury deliberations suggesting that actual jurors may react less favorably
to a plaintiffs ad damnum than mock jurors typically have and concluding that "the dangers
of bias from these potential anchors offered by attorneys appear to be overstated as applied to
the real world of deliberating juries").
96. Valerie P. Hans & Valerie F. Reyna, To Dollars from Sense: Qualitative to
Quantitative Translationin Jury Damage Awards, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 120, 141-42
(2011) ("In both judge and jury trials, the economic damage award reached by the decision
maker is a significant predictor of the noneconomic damage award. . . . [T]he amount of
economic damage that a plaintiff experiences in a case serves as a slightly stronger determinant
of the noneconomic award for juries as compared to judges.").
97. Ebbe B. Ebbesen & Vladimir J. Koneani, The Process ofSentencing Adult Felons:A
CausalAnalysis ofJudicialDecisions, in THE TRIAL PROCESS 413, 434 (Bruce Dennis Sales
ed., 1981) (finding that "[jiudges and probation officers agreed on the sentence in over 80%
of the cases").
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of sentences assigned by Maryland trial judges based upon mishandled sentencing
forms also showed that erroneous sentencing recommendations influenced judges'
sentences. 98 Recent research on judges in Taiwan who set compensation rates for
unlawful use of land demonstrated that these judges rely heavily on awards suggested
by the litigants.99
These studies indicate that judges' damage awards and criminal sentences are not
always well grounded in reasonable estimates of a case's merits. But the evidence is
not conclusive because, with one exception, the anchors in these studies arguably
provided some relevant information. In the case of the motion, the defendant could
have been conveying its belief that the case was truly worth very little. In the
settlement cases, the offer by the plaintiff is actually relevant, even though judges
are supposed to ignore it. The judges who saw the reference to $415,300 in the
employment discrimination case also could have interpreted this as an indication that
the case was much more serious than the facts suggested. Similarly, the high initial
interest rate could have signaled to the bankruptcy judges that the debtor presented
enormous credit risks that other facts did not reveal. Likewise, all of the research
using archival data involved anchors that were apt to be meaningful, or at least appear
to be meaningful, to the judges. Only the German experiment involving the roll of
the dice as an anchor provided direct evidence that numeric reference points that are
transparently irrelevant affect judges. The study is helpful in this regard, but using
dice as a reference point is obviously strange and might have undermined the judges'
willingness to take the study seriously. It is hard to imagine what the judges thought
that the point of the dice roll was in this experiment. Nevertheless, determining
whether arbitrary anchors distort judges' decisions in more realistic settings requires
further investigation.
In sum, the weight of evidence suggests that anchors influence judges
excessively. Even if some of the anchors in the studies appear to convey
meaningful information, the influence of anchoring cuts across so many domains
that it appears to be a robust phenomenon.
III. THE CURRENT STUDY
To determine whether judges are subject to arbitrary influences that can produce
erratic awards and sentences, we conducted four new studies in which we exposed
active trial judges to various forms of anchors. In these studies, we used the same
methodology that we have used in past research on judges.' 00 That is, judges
attending judicial education conferences reviewed the facts of a hypothetical case
that called for a numeric judgment. All of the judges reviewed the same case, except
we exposed some of the judges to a variation in the fact pattern that was designed to

98. Shawn D. Bushway, Emily G. Owens & Anne Morrison Piehl, Sentencing Guidelines
and JudicialDiscretion:Quasi-ExperimentalEvidencefrom Human CalculationErrors,9 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 291, 298 (2012). Only 10% of the forms were filled out correctly,

thereby producing inaccurate sentence recommendations. Id.
99. See Yun-chien Chang, Kong-pin Chen, Chang-ching Lin & Yu-sheng Liu,
Anchoring Effects in Real Litigation: An Empirical Study (2013) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
100. See, e.g., Guthrie et al., supra note 78.
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test for the anchoring effect. In the first of these studies, we tested whether the metric
used to sentence defendants (months versus years) influenced the judges' sentences.
In the second study, we explored whether informing judges of a damage cap would
alter how they assessed damage awards. In the third, we simply varied the order in
which judges sentenced two criminal defendants on the theory that the first sentence
might anchor the second. In the final study, we used a plaintiff's offhand reference
to an award on a "court TV show" as an anchor, and we also tested an inoculant
designed to eliminate or reduce the influence of anchoring.
In all instances, the hypothetical cases were embedded within a group of three to
five other cases designed to address other issues. On the last page of the survey, we
asked the judges to identify their gender, years of experience as a judge, and political
orientation.o' Finally, we gave the judges the opportunity to respond to the survey and
participate in the educational program but to withdraw their survey for purposes of data
analysis. A small number ofjudges did this and were removed from the analysis.
A. Study 1: Scaling Effects

- "Five hundred twenty-five thousand six hundred minutes. How do you
measure, measure a year?"l 02
The widespread influence of anchoring on numeric judgments suggests that
damage awards and sentences do not reflect stable assessments of the appropriate
amount of compensation or punishment. There are many scales on which quantities
may be expressed. If numeric assessments are as malleable as the research on
anchoring suggests, judges might be vulnerable to distortions of the scale they use to
render judgments. Even though years and dollars are units with clear meaning that
judges should understand well, the research on anchoring suggests that people's
perception of such units can vary.
Scale distorts judgments and preferences. A wide range of studies have
documented such effects. Consumers prefer rewards programs that are denominated
in thousands of points rather than hundreds, even though the units are set
arbitrarily. 0 3 Stock splits increase share value, even though they have no effect on a
firm's true worth.'" Travelers who have to translate their currency of higher value

101. We used the following question to elicit political orientation: "Which of the two major
political parties in the United States most closely matches your own political beliefs?" We then
listed the two major parties with a blank next to each for the judges to check. Most judges
answered this question. Those who did not or who wrote "other" were retained in the primary
analysis of the effect of anchor but were excluded from analysis of their political orientation. We
did not ask this question of Canadian judges, military judges, or Dutch judges.
102. JONATHAN LARSON, Seasons of Love, on RENT: ORIGINAL BROADWAY

CAST

RECORDING (Dreamworks Records 1996).
103. See Rajesh Bagchi & Xingbo Li, Illusionary Progress in Loyalty Programs:
Magnitudes, Reward Distances, and Step-Size Ambiguity, 37 J. CONSUMER REs. 888, 892-95
(2010) (reporting research in which subjects expressed a greater affinity for a consumer reward
program in which points and prizes were denominated in thousands).
104. See Subhankar Nayak & Nagpurnanand R. Prabhala, Disentangling the Dividend
Information in Splits: A Decomposition Using ConditionalEvent-Study Methods, 14 REv. FIN.
STUD. 1083, 1112 (2001) (analyzing data on stock splits and concluding that "46% of split
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into one of lower value (such as when Americans use pesos) tend to overspend. 05
Similarly, American consumers express less willingness to pay for a silk tie as the
nominal denomination of the currency in which the item is priced increases.10 6
Workers are happier with a 5% raise in a time of 12% inflation than with a 7% salary
cut in the face of 0% inflation, even though the two are economically identical. 0
Gamblers treat a 5-9 in 100 chance of winning as higher than a 1 in 10 chance. 0 s
People planning for a wilderness trek state that a battery for a GPS device needed to
guide them will be more reliable when the battery life is described as 120 minutes rather
than 2 hours.' 09 People say they are willing to pay 126 euros for a cellphone with an
advertised battery life of 6 days, but only 102 euros for one with a battery life of 144
hours.I 0 Movie watchers state that they would prefer a movie rental plan that offered
7 movies per week for $10 per week over one that offered 9 movies per week for $12
per week; but their preferences reverse when the plans were multiplied out into a whole
year; that is, they preferred a plan that offered 468 (9 x 52) movies per year for $12 per
week over one that offered 364 (7 x 52) movies per year for $10 per week."'
As this research suggests, changes in time scales commonly have a large effect
on judgment and choice. People find cancer risks to be more frightening when
expressed as a risk per day rather than as a risk per year." 2 People perceive an

valuation effects are not caused by dividend information implied by splits").
105. See Klaus Wertenbroch, Dilip Soman & Amitava Chattopadhyay, On the Perceived
Value ofMoney: The Reference Dependence ofCurrency Numerosity Effects, 34 J. CONSUMER

RES. 1, 7 (2007) (presenting evidence showing that "consumers ... anchor[] on the numerosity
of the nominal difference between that reference standard and the price of the transaction in
order to estimate the real value of that transaction").
106. See Priya Raghubir & Joydeep Srivastava, Effect of Face Value on Product Valuation
in ForeignCurrencies,29 J. CONSUMER RES. 335, 338-39 (2002) ("[Slubjects' willingness to
pay increased with the face value of the foreign currency as the exchange rate became a larger
multiple of the home currency.").
107. See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairnessas a Constraint
on ProfitSeeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 728, 731 (1986) (reporting
that 22% of subjects stated that a 7% raise in the face of 12% inflation was unfair, but 62%
stated that a 7% reduction in salary in the absence of inflation was unfair); see also Eldar
Shafir, Peter Diamond & Amos Tversky, Money Illusion, 112 Q.J. ECON. 341, 366-72 (1997)
(documenting numerous examples of similar effects).
108. See Veronika Denes-Raj & Seymour Epstein, Conflict Between Intuitive and Rational
Processing: When People Behave Against Their Better Judgment, 66 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 819, 822 (1994).
109. See Y. Charles Zhang & Norbert Schwarz, How and Why 1 Year Differsfrom 365 Days:
A ConversationalLogic Analysis ofInferencesfrom the Granularityof QuantitativeExpressions,

39 J. CONSUMER RES. 248, 255 (2012) ("Participants estimated that a battery life claim of 'up to
2 hours' would translate into actual service of 1.49 hours (equal to 89 minutes), whereas a claim
of 'up to 120 minutes' would translate into actual service of 106 minutes.").
I 10. See Christophe Lembregts & Mario Pandelaere, Are All Units CreatedEqual? The
Effect of Default Units on Product Evaluations, 39 J. CONSUMER RES. 1275, 1282 (2013).

111. See Katherine A. Burson, Richard P. Larrick & John G. Lynch, Jr., Six of One, Half
Dozen ofthe Other: Expandingand ContractingNumerical DimensionsProducesPreference
Reversals, 20 PSYCHOL. Sa. 1074, 1076-77 (2009).
112. See Sucharita Chandran & Geeta Menon, When a Day Means More than a Year: Effects
of TemporalFramingon Judgments ofHealthRisk, 31 J. CONSUMER RES. 375,384 (2004).
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increase in the length of a product warranty from 84 months to 108 months as a more
valuable increase than an increase from 7 years to 9 years." People asked how much
they will spend in 12 months provide loWer numbers than when they are asked how
much they will spend in 1 year.l1 4 When offered a chance to donate to a worthy cause,
52% of MBA students said they would be willing to donate 85 cents per day, even
though only 30% were willing to donate $300 per year."' Public radio campaigns
commonly ask for a donation that amounts to "pennies a day" rather than dollars per
year." 6 One year, it seems, does not mean the same thing to most people as 12
months or 365 days.
These results can be bewildering, but they begin to make sense in light of how
psychologists have found that people make choices. People do not make purchasing
decisions by tapping into an underlying sense of value, but instead construct
decisions using simple cognitive processes."' 7 As many of the studies suggest, people
prefer goods that come in larger numbers and hence prefer goods with attributes
denominated in smaller units-a phenomenon known as "numerosity."" 8 Larger
numbers often mean more of an item is available and hence make the amount of that
item seem more valuable." 9 Even chickens will work harder to earn a kernel of corn
that has been divided into four parts than one that is whole.1 20 People also assume
that the unit is chosen in a meaningful fashion' 2' and therefore infer that smaller units
connote a more precise estimate.' 22 Furthermore, people like units that are familiar

113. See Mario Pandelaere, Barbara Briers & Christophe Lembregts, How To Make a 29%
Increase Look Bigger: The Unit Effect in Option Comparisons, 38 J. CONSUMER REs. 308,

310-11 (2011).
114. Gillden 1Jlktimen, Manoj Thomas & Vicki G. Morwitz, Will I Spend More in 12
Months or a Year? The Effect ofEase ofEstimation and Confidence on Budget Estimates, 35
J. CONSUMER RES. 245, 253 (2008).
115. John T. Gourville, Pennies-a-Day:The Effect of TemporalRefrainingon Transaction
Evaluation, 24 J. CONSUMER RES. 395, 396 (1998) (reporting that "the percentage of subjects

agreeing to donate was significantly higher under the [donation-per-day condition] than under
the aggregate framing (52 vs. 30 percent .. .)").
116. See, e.g., id. at 395 ("Chicago Public Radio has an ongoing membership drive in
which individuals are asked to join their 'Dollar-a-Day Club."').
117. See Lichtenstein & Slovic, supra note 31, at 2 ("The variability in the ways we
construct and reconstruct our preferences yields preferences that are labile, inconsistent,
subject to factors we are unaware of, and not always in our own best interests. Indeed, so
pervasive is this liability that the very notion of a 'true' preference must, in many situations,
be rejected.").
118. See Brett W. Pelham, Tin Tin Sumarta & Laura Myaskovsky, The Easy Path from
Many to Much: The Numerosity Heuristic, 26 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 103, 104 (1994)
("[P]eople ... sometimes overinfer quantity from numerosity.").
119. Id. at 105 ("[M]ore pieces of something usually turns out to be more of that
something." (emphasis in original)).
120. John B. Wolf & Martin D. Kaplon, Effect of Amount of Reward and Consummative
Activity on Learningin Chickens, 31 J. COMP. PSYCHOL. 353, 358-59 (1941).

121. See Zhang & Schwarz, supra note 109, at 249 (arguing that norms of communication
suggest that people will convey information in relevant units).
122. Id. at 251 ("[C]onsumers infer that the real value is closer to the communicated value
when it is conveyed in fine-grained rather than coarse units . . . .").
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and convey some sense of fluency and meaning.' 23 Finally, because people tend to
prefer commodities that are easier to assess,1 24 expressing the quantity of something
in a meaningful metric makes it more attractive.' 25
A study conducted by McAuliff and Bornstein demonstrates the potential power
of scale in a legal setting.1 26 These researchers had jury-eligible adults read a
description of a personal injury case in which the defendant was clearly liable. The
researchers asked their subjects to identify an appropriate award for the 2 years of
pain and suffering that the plaintiff had experienced. The plaintiff's attorney varied
the request for damages in his closing argument by doing one of the following: not
stating an amount (control condition); asking for $10 per hour for 2 years (hours
scale); asking for $7300 per month for 24 months (months scale); or asking for
$175,000 (anchor condition). The requests for $175,000 and $10 per hour produced
the highest awards. The $175,000 likely acted as an anchor, which explains why it
produced high awards. The ability of the hours scale to produce a high award relative
to the monthly scale shows the importance of scaling. For many of the subjects,
$7300 per month and $10 per hour can easily be compared to a wage or salary. For
most, $10 per hour might not seem like much, so it seemed like a reasonable basis
for an award. But $7300 per month seems like a lot of money each month (even
though it is almost identical to $10 per hour times 24 hours times 30 days). The study
thus shows both the power of anchors and the effect that variation in scale can have
on judgment. Different scales convey different meanings and thus produce variations
in how much an injury seems worth.
Do variations in scale affect judges when they make quantitative judgments?
Unlike the nonjudge adults in McAuliff and Bornstein's study, judges are experts.
They might not be affected by specious differences in amounts or durations. On the
other hand, variations in scale might convey different impressions and trigger
different associations in judges, just as they do in others. One year might not mean
the same to a judge as 12 months, and 360 months might not trigger the same
impression as 30 years.
1. Methods and Materials
To test whether judges are vulnerable to such scaling effects, we gave judges a
one-page description of a criminal case and asked them to impose a criminal

123. See Lembregts & Pandelaere, supra note 110, at 1278 ("Given that people are more
familiar with default units, consumers should be able to process attribute information more
easily when it appears in default units rather than in nondefault units.").
124. See Christopher K. Hsee, The EvaluabilityHypothesis: An ExplanationforPreference
Reversals Between Joint and Separate Evaluations of Alternatives, 67 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUm. DECISION PROCESSES 247, 255-56 (1996) (describing a series of studies
showing that people prefer items that are easier to evaluate).
125. See Lembregts & Pandelaere, supra note 110, at 1283-84 (presenting evidence
supporting the researchers' prediction that "the processing fluency associated with the unit
mediates the effects of default units on product evaluations").
126. Bradley D. McAuliff& Brian H. Bornstein, All Anchors Are Not CreatedEqual: The
Effects of Per Diem Versus Lump Sum Requests on Pain and Suffering Awards, 34 LAW
& Hum. BEHAV. 164 (2010).
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sentence. The materials described a defendant named "Smith" as having "pled guilty
to simple voluntary manslaughter." The materials indicated that Smith admitted
stabbing a fellow customer to death in a bar after "the victim informed him that he
had had sexual intercourse with Smith's fianc6." Smith had not been drinking. The
materials also described Smith's background as follows:
Smith is 23 years old and has no significant criminal history, though he
was once arrested, but not charged, following a bar fight while he was
intoxicated. He is in good health and does not appear to have a substance
abuse problem, although he admits that he occasionally drinks to excess.
He has been employed as a custodian for the past four years at a large
office complex. He remains unmarried and has no children.
We asked all of the judges to sentence Smith. We posed the following question to
half of the judges: "Without regard to the sentence maximum in your own
jurisdiction, how many years would you sentence Smith to serve in prison, based on
/years." For the other
the facts above?" This was followed by a blank labeled "
half, we replaced the word "years" with "months" and followed this with a blank
labeled " /months." In effect, we asked half of the judges to sentence the defendant
in years and the other half in months.
We presented these materials to 135 judges attending the American Judges'
Association annual conference in Denver, Colorado, in 2010. These judges attended
a plenary session entitled "How Do Judges Judge" on the first day of their
conference. These judges came from all over the United States, although most were
state court judges. 127 The judges had an average of 13 years of experience as judges
(a median of 12 years), ranging from 6 months to 40 years. Of the 128 who reported
their gender, 37 (29%) were females. Of the 112 judges who reported their political
affiliation as Republican or Democratic (we omitted those who identified as other,
independent, or simply refused to answer), 38 (34%) were Republicans and 62%
were Democrats.

128

Substantively, the appropriate sentence for voluntary manslaughter varies by
jurisdiction. Procedurally, some of the states rely primarily on sentences assigned in
29
years and some on sentences assigned in months (as the federal system does).1
Furthermore, some states follow sentencing guidelines that restrict or guide
sentencing, while others do not.' 30 Our materials asked judges to sentence without

127. All but 3 of the judges were trial judges.
128. A total of 23 judges identified themselves as independent, unaffiliated, or did not
respond to our question about political affiliation: "Which of the two major political parties in
the United States most closely matches your own political beliefs?" We excluded these judges
from any analysis of political party so that the judges are simply identified as Republican or
Democratic. We treated political orientation the same way in all of our studies. Thus, the
percentage of Democratic and Republican judges always adds up to 100%.
129. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supranote 4, § 5A (depicting a sentencing table denoted
in months); see also, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (West 2014) (years); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-4704 (2007) (months); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42 (West 2014) (years); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-18-1 (LexisNexis Supp. 2014) (months); MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
COMM'N, MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES & COMMENTARY § 4A (2014) (months).
130.
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regard to the sentencing maximum in their own jurisdiction and did not provide any
guidelines for judges to follow in setting the sentence.
2. Results
Sentencing format had an enormous effect on the judges. The 71 judges who
sentenced in years provided an average sentence of 9.7 years, or 115 months.'3 1 In
contrast, the 60 judges who sentenced in months provided an average sentence of
only 66.4 months, or 5.5 years. This difference was statistically significant.13 2 As
Table 1 (below) shows, the distribution of the sentences varied markedly between
the two formats. Only 22% (13 out of 60) of the judges sentencing in months imposed
sentences greater than the median sentence of judges sentencing in years (9 years),
and only 1.7% (1 out of 60) of the judges sentencing in months assigned a sentence
greater than the 75th percentile of judges sentencing in years (12.5 years).
Table 1. Sentence length by condition: average, percentiles and standard deviation (in years)
Condition

(and n)

25th

50th

75th

Standard

Average

percentile

percentile

percentile

deviation

5.5
9.7

3.0
5.0

5.0
9.0

8.0
12.5

3.5
6.8

Months (60)
Years (71)

The judges' demographic backgrounds had little effect on these results. Male
judges assigned slightly longer sentences on average than female judges (8.1 versus
7.0 years), but this difference was not statistically significant.'1 3 Judges who
identified as Democrats assigned essentially identical sentences to those who
identified as Republicans (7.8 versus 7.7 years, respectively, which was not a
statistically significant difference).1 34 Experience did not correlate with sentence
length.' None of these variables interacted statistically significantly with the
variation in scale.' 3 6

The judges sentencing in years expressed greater variability than judges
sentencing in months. The standard deviation of the judges' sentences was nearly
twice as large among judges sentencing in years as compared to months. This

CONTiNUUM 3 (2008) (reporting that 21 states have sentencing guidelines).
131. Three judges did not respond to this question.
132. t(129) = 4.51, p < 0.001. Months were divided by 12 to facilitate the comparison.
Because the standard errors varied, the t-test was performed with no assumption of equal
variance in each condition.
133. t(126)= l.00,p=0.32.
134. t(l10) = 0.09,p = 0.92.
135. r=.05,p=0.56.
136. This analysis was accomplished with a linear regression of the sentence on the scale
(years versus months), experience, gender, party affiliation, and an interaction of these three
terms with the scale. The t statistics for the three interaction terms were 1.06, 1.05, and 0.14
respectively, with p values of 0.29, 0.30, and 0.88.
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difference was statistically significant."' That said, in both conditions, the standard
deviation was roughly proportional to the average length of the sentence in that
condition. Hence, it does not seem that the judges in the years condition sentenced
more erratically than the judges in the months condition.
3. Discussion
Judges sentencing in months imposed shorter sentences than judges sentencing in
years. To the judges sentencing in years, roughly 9 years was about the right
sentence. But fewer than 25% of the judges sentencing in months assigned sentences
of that length or greater. Although 9 years seemed like an appropriate sentence to the
judges, 108 months seemed far too long.
The result is consistent with the previous findings concerning anchoring in judges.
Anchors distort the sense of scale that facilitates a reliable translation of a qualitative
sense of the appropriate sentence into a numeric sentence. So too does the actual
scale. Apparently, 12 months seems different to judges than 1 year. In this scenario,
the scale provided no information to the judges about the case, and yet it distorted
their sentences.
This result does not necessarily suggest that jurisdictions that assign sentences in
months are more lenient than those that sentence in years. We suspect that judges
become accustomed to the scale that they are using over time. Our result suggests
only that in an unfamiliar, impressionistic setting, judges reacted to the scale.
At least one jurisdiction has attempted to take advantage of this scaling effect in order
to influence the duration of sentences. In 1991, Finnish "[c]ourts were ... encouraged
to use short sentences of imprisonment by instructing them to mete out the shorter
sentences in days instead of months."'3 8 Sentence length declined after the change.
Because other reforms accompanied the change in metric, it is impossible to determine
the exact cause of the decline with certainty, but our research implicates the metric."
The possible difference between judges accustomed to sentencing in months
versus years suggests that one potential explanation for the effect is weak
mathematics among those judges who normally sentence in years. We believe that
judges are perfectly capable of multiplying 9 x 12 to reach the appropriate sentence.
The judges might not have done the math explicitly, however, and may have simply
made a rough estimate of the appropriate sentence. The result thus resembles an early
study of anchoring conducted by Tversky and Kahneman in which they asked
subjects either to determine the product of 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 x 6 x 7 x 8 or the product
of 8 x 7 x 6 x 5 x 4 x 3 x 2 x 1.140 Any undergraduate is capable of solving either of
these mathematical functions precisely, but most of the subjects made intuitive
estimates instead. Those who started with the lower numbers produced lower
estimates than those who started with the higher numbers. Tversky and Kahneman
suggested that the subjects multiplied the first few numbers, used that partial product

137. F(70, 29) = 3.69,p <0.001.
138. See Tapio Lappi-Seppihi, Sentencingand Punishment in Finland: The Decline ofthe
Repressive Ideal, in SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 92, 113 (Michael

Tonry & Richard S. Frase eds., 2001).
139. Id. at 114.
140. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 1, at 1128.
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as an anchor, and made inadequate upward adjustments. Thus, when the initial
numbers used were higher, the subjects produced higher final estimates.
We also suspect that the effect of scale might vary with the severity of the crime.
Severe crimes that demand lengthy sentences of 20 years or more might produce the
opposite effect. As the number of months grows into the hundreds, judges might start
to become insensitive to the length of the sentence. The difference between 300 and
360 months might not seem as notable as the difference between 25 and 30 years.
Likewise, sentences at the low end of the scale also reverse the result we identified.
A sentence of 24 months might seem longer than a sentence of 2 years.
The variation among sentencing systems might provide one alternative account
of our result that suggests that the scale inadvertently provided some information to
the judges. Some jurisdictions assign sentences in months (or even days) for less
severe crimes and in years for more serious crimes.141 Judges who are familiar with
such systems might have assumed that the "years" prompt suggested that the crime
was more serious and hence should draw a more severe sentence. We doubt that this
is the explanation, though, for two reasons. First, the magnitude of the effect is too
large to be explained by the behavior of a small number ofjudges. The scale seemed
to shift the range of sentences, suggesting that the scale influenced most of the
judges, not just the small number who reside in a jurisdiction with such a system.
Second, the crime used in the survey is a familiar one to judges. Voluntary
manslaughter is a serious crime in every jurisdiction and merits a lengthy sentence.
Experienced judges could not conceivably have confused this crime with a low-level
barroom brawl that might have produced a short sentence for assault and battery.
This was a serious crime, and we are confident judges knew it.
B. Study 2: Damage Caps
To test whether anchoring would influence judges even when the anchor cannot
plausibly provide them with relevant information, we considered highlighting
numeric reference points of which judges were already aware. Our initial study of
the effect of filing a motion to dismiss for failing to meet the minimum amount in
controversy for federal diversity of citizenship jurisdiction itself was an effort of this
sort. We suspect that federal judges are well aware that the jurisdictional threshold
for diversity claims is $75,000. Thus, mentioning the amount in the motion provided
no new information but, as we noted above, filing the motion might have suggested to
judges that the case was worth far less than they had thought. The legal system,
however, provides numerous dollar amounts of various sorts that judges understand
well and yet might not relate to a particular case.
Damage caps are one source of such numbers. Numerous jurisdictions have
implemented damage caps in some classes of cases over the past two decades, usually
as part of an effort at tort reform.' 42 Legislatures intend such caps as a response to

141. For example, New York expresses sentences for misdemeanors in months, see N.Y
2014), and felonies in years, see N.Y. PENAL

PENAL LAW § 70.15 (McKinney 2009 & Supp.
LAW § 70.00 (McKinney 2009 & Supp. 2014).

142. See Michael I. Krauss, A MedicalLiability Toolkit, IncludingADR, 2 J.L. (1 J. LEGAL
349 app. a (2012) (summarizing state-by-state damage caps and other laws
applicable to medical liability); Robbennolt & Studebaker, supra note 69, at 354 (discussing
METRICs)
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43
the perceived problem of "runaway juries" that award apparently outrageous sums.1

Several scholars have studied the effect of such damage caps on both actual awards
and settlement amounts.'" Caps are obviously effective in reducing the prevalence
of exceptionally high awards because they prohibit awards in excess of a certain
amount. Scholars have also identified two unintended effects, however. First, juries
limited by the cap in a particular category of awards tend to compensate by awarding
more in another category.1 45 For example, juries confronting caps on pain and
suffering awards appear to be inclined to award more in punitive damages.1 46 Second,
caps create anchors that increase awards in cases that would otherwise produce small
awards.1 47 This effect even extends to parties who are settling a dispute.14 8 So
influential are damage caps that many have suggested that juries should not be
informed of them, lest they have unintended effects on damage awards.1 4 9
The research on anchoring predicts that damage caps will influence damage
awards. Each of the theoretical accounts of how anchoring works predicts that
damage caps will increase awards in low-value cases.s0 If jurors are simply
cognitively lazy, they are apt to use the anchor as a starting point and adjust
downward.'s' This adjustment is apt to be inadequate for cases that would otherwise
produce an award that is a fraction of the cap, so exposure to the cap will produce a

the caps that Alabama, Florida, and Nevada implement by allowing punitive damages only up
to a certain multiple of the compensatory damages); Joseph Sanders, Reforming General
Damages: A Good Tort Reform, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 115, 129-43 (2008)
(discussing damage caps); Studdert et al., supra note 7, at 63-66 (briefly summarizing the
genesis, shortcomings, and consequences of damage caps).
143. See Robbennolt & Studebaker, supra note 69, at 366 ("[C]ourts and legislatures alike
have pursued tort reform efforts largely aimed at reining in what are perceived to be juries out
of control. ... One proposed method for reigning in damage award amounts is to limit, or cap,
the amount that can be awarded in punitive damages.")
144. See generally, e.g., Sandra N. Hurd & Frances E. Zollers, State Punitive Damages
Statutes:A ProposedAlternative, 20 J. LEGIs. 191 (1994) (arguing that, in some cases, limiting
damage awards can inhibit the purpose of punitive damages, such as deterrence); Jacqueline
Perczek, On Efficiency, Punishment, Deterrence, andFairness:A Survey ofPunitive Damages
Law and a ProposedJury Instruction, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 825 (1993).
145. See Robbennolt & Studebaker, supra note 69, at 356. Although damage caps typically
limit awards to selected categories of damages-usually noneconomic damages or punitive
damages-at least one state has a comprehensive cap that includes all categories of damage
awards in medical cases. See Krauss, supra note 142, at 374 (citing VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-581.15 (2011)).
146. See Robbennolt & Studebaker, supra note 69, at 366.
147. Id. at 361; see also Ronen Avraham & Alvaro Bustos, The UnexpectedEffects ofCaps
on Non-Economic Damages, 30 INT'LREV. L. & EcoN. 291,291 (2010) ("[W]hile caps always
reduce the recoveries of plaintiffs with large claims, caps may increase recoveries of plaintiffs
with low claims compared to their recoveries in states with no caps." (emphasis in original));
Hinsz & Indahl, supra note 69, at 1006.
148. See Orr & Guthrie, supra note 52, at 611.
149. See Michael S. Kang, Comment, Don't Tell JuriesAbout Statutory Damage Caps:
The Merits of Nondisclosure, 66 U. CI. L. REV. 469, 480-86 (1999) (explaining the various
effects of disclosing the damage cap to jurors).
150. See Orr & Guthrie, supra note 52, at 605-11.
151. Id.
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higher award. Similarly, if jurors initially attempt to determine whether the case is
worth more or less than the cap, they will consider the features of the case that
suggest it would merit a high award. 152 Even if jurors reject the notion that the case
is worth more than the cap, their attention has been drawn to those aspects of the case
that suggest it would merit a high award. Finally, and we believe most plausibly, the
cap provides jurors a sense of scale. Jurors contemplating an award of $10,000 will
learn that cases of this type could be worth fifty times as much, which might make
the $10,000 award seem inadequate. In short, damage caps are exactly the kind of
anchor apt to have a large effect on judgment.
It comes as little surprise to researchers that damage caps have a large effect on
awards provided by juries,' but what about judges? Although no previous research
on the influence of damage caps on judges exists, the concerns that scholars have
raised about the influence of damage caps assumes that judges are immune from any
such effects. The reform efforts all involve blinding juries to the existence of anchors
or giving judges greater control over damage awards.' 54 Unlike jurors, however,
judges cannot remain ignorant of the damage caps. If damage caps have a powerful
effect on jurors' damage awards, they seem likely to affect judges as well.
1. Methods and Materials
To determine whether damage caps influence judges, we conducted an
experiment involving 115 Canadian trial judges and 65 newly elected trial judges in
New York State. The Canadian judges were attending an annual conference
organized by the National Judicial Institute in Canada in 2010, 2011, and 2013. The
conference is held each year for judges who have served between five and ten years
(which they refer to as their "sophomore" years). Judges are not obliged to attend,
but each year the week-long conference draws roughly 40 judges. The judges at the
conference attend each of the sessions. Our session was entitled "How Judges
Decide" in 2010 and "The Working of the Judicial Mind" in 2011 and 2013. We did
not ask these judges their political affiliation. Of the 111 judges who informed us of
their gender, 51 (or 46%) were female. For the 25 (22%) of the judges from Quebec,
the materials were translated into French.
Canada is an ideal jurisdiction in which to test the influence of damage caps on
trial judges. In 1978, the Canadian Supreme Court, in a trilogy of cases, imposed a
cap of $100,000 on noneconomic damage awards in civil cases.'s The court
explicitly indicated that the cap must be adjusted for inflation as measured by the
Bank of Canada inflation index on a monthly basis.' 56 The existence of the cap is

152. Id.
153. Id. at 605-08.
154. See Kang, supra note 149, at 481-86.
155. Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229 (Can.); Amold v. Teno, [1978]
2 S.C.R. 287 (Can.); Thornton v. Prince George Sch. Dist. No. 57, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 267 (Can.).
156. D. BRUCE GARRow & KATHERINE L. AYRE, CONFERENCE ON INT'L AVIATION
LIABILITY & INS., THE RECOVERY OF NON-PECUNIARY DAMAGES IN CANADA: THE CAP ON
RECOVERY, JURY TRIALS, AND OTHER UNIQUE CONSIDERATIONS FOR GENERAL DAMAGE

AwARDs 4 (2009) ("In Canada, general damage awards for pain and suffering are currently
capped at $100,000 and indexed to inflation.").
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well known to Canadian trial judges. Because of the monthly adjustment, however,
the judges have a rough idea of the amount of the cap, but likely do not know the
precise amount.
Because we could not realistically manipulate the existence of the cap, or even its
amount, we instead varied whether we informed the judges of the precise amount or
not. We presentedjudges with a case that we expected would produce a nonpecuniary
award between $30,000 and $50,000-well below the cap. The materials described
the case as arising. from an automobile accident. The defendant was a large
package-delivery company. The plaintiff was "a 31-year-old male software
programmer" who was injured by a truck driven "erratically" by one of the
defendant's drivers. The defendant admitted that it was liable. The judges were told
that the parties had settled all claims for medical expenses and economic losses,
including lost wages. This meant that the only issue for the judges in this bench trial
was to determine the appropriate compensatory damage award for pain and suffering.
The materials described the plaintiff s symptoms in some detail:
The evidence concerning the nature and extent of the plaintiffs
residual symptoms was reasonably clear. Shortly after the accident (it is
now approximately four years later), the plaintiff was diagnosed with
cervical and thoracic strain and a severe concussion. The effects of the
concussion persisted for about a year, during which time the plaintiff
experienced memory problems. The plaintiff suffered no other cognitive
problems and the memory problems have not recurred.
Although the plaintiffs doctors originally concluded that he would
recover fully within about a year, the symptoms resulting from the
cervical and thoracic strain gradually plateaued. The plaintiff still has
stiffness in his neck, which is annoying and causes him to experience
severe headaches that are sometimes debilitating. The plaintiff also
experiences numbness in his left hand if he works at the computer for
more than a few hours at a stretch.
The plaintiff's job requires that he use a computer for several hours a
day. Only the more severe headaches cause him to lose any notable time
at work. He manages to work through the less severe headaches with the
assistance of over-the-counter pain medication and the numbness in his
left hand dissipates if he takes a short break. He testified that his pain
makes it hard for him to function as a parent for his two children, making
him short-tempered and tired. He complained that he is often unable to
help his children with their homework or play sports with them.
Although his doctors have not identified any specific physical injury
as the cause of the plaintiffs symptoms, he might have suffered some
slight brachial nerve damage during the accident. Doctors expect that his
stiffness, headaches, and numbness will persist.
For half of the judges, the materials indicated that the defendant contended "that
the injuries are not serious and do not warrant a significant damage award." The
materials then asked the judges, "How much would you award the plaintiff for pain
and suffering?" For the other half of the judges, we included an additional sentence.
In 2010, the additional sentence stated: "The defendant also reminded you that an
award of noneconomic damages cannot exceed the cap imposed by the Canadian
Supreme Court, which is currently $332,236." In 2011, we included the same
sentence for half of the judges, except that we indicated that the plaintiff(rather than
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the defendant) provided the reminder, and we also updated the amount to $342,535.
In 2013, the materials reminded the judges of the cap (then updated to $367,160) but
did not attribute the reminder about the cap to either party.
We also gave a similar set of materials to 65 newly elected trial judges in New
York State. New York does not have a damage cap akin to the Canadian limitation,
but for half of the judges, the materials added the following: "Further suppose that
the parties have stipulated that a statutory damage cap for common-carrier
defendants of $750,000 applies in this instance. Thus, you may not award more than
$750,000." These judges had no previous judicial experience and were attending an
annual conference for new judges in New York. Among the 63 judges who identified
their gender, 35% were female. Among the 62 who identified their political
orientation, 26% were Republicans and 74% were Democrats.
2. Results
Overall, the reference to the damage cap influenced the Canadian judges. The
median award among the Canadian judges who learned about the cap was $85,000,
as opposed to $57,500 among those who did not. 1 7 This difference was statistically
significant.' This effect was driven almost entirely by the variation in which the
defendant mentioned the cap. 159
Table 2. Median award by condition (in thousands of dollars) and sample size
Condition

Party who identifies damage cap

New York

No reference to cap

Cap referenced

Defendant
No attribution
Plaintiff
Total

45.0 (19)
55.0 (15)
87.5 (14)
57.5 (48)

100.0 (26)
60.0 (16)
97.5 (22)
85.0 (64)

No attribution

100.0 (28)

250.0 (30)

157. Three judges did not respond; 2 of these judges were in the condition in which the
plaintiff referred to the damage cap, and 1 was in the condition in which the reference to the
damage cap was unattributed.
158. Using the Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.01. The studies involving damage awards
generally produced positively skewed distributions of awards with some high outliers, making
untransformed parametric statistical analysis unreliable. We therefore report the more stable
median awards, rather than the means. When we compare only two samples, we use the
Mann-Whitney rank-sum test as our test statistic. When multiple conditions were compared
or when we tested for the influence of demographic factors, however, we transformed the data,
analyzing the square root of each award rather than the raw award.
159. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the square root of the awards on the anchor
condition and each of the three versions reveals a significant main effect of version (F(2, 106)
= 5.52,p = 0.005) and a significant interaction (F(2,106) = 4.84,p <0.01).
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The 64 male and 43 female judges did not provide significantly different awards,
nor did the anchor affect them differently.16 The 25 French-speaking and the 90
English-speaking judges likewise did not provide different awards, and neither did
they react differently to the anchor.' 6
The effect of the anchor was even more pronounced among the new New York
judges. Those who learned of the damage cap awarded a median of $250,000, as
compared to $100,000 among those who did not learn about it, which was a
significant difference.1 62 None of the judges awarded more than $750,000, and hence
the damage cap did not meaningfully constrain the judges-instead, it acted as an
anchor that increased awards.
Among the judges in New York, gender and political orientation had some effect
on awards. The damage cap influenced the female judges more than male judges.
The 39 male judges awarded a median of $100,000, as compared to $137,500 among
the 18 female judges. The anchor also seemed to have a greater effect on the female
judges: male judges awarded a median of $50,000 in the no-anchor condition and
$200,000 in the anchor condition, while female judges awarded a median of
$100,000 in the no-anchor condition and $400,000 in the anchor condition. Both
gender and the interaction of gender and anchoring were marginally significant.16 3
The 42 judges who identified themselves as Democrats awarded a median of
$150,000, as compared to $100,000 among the 13 judges who identified themselves
as Republicans. The anchor had a greater effect on the Republican judges:
Democratic judges awarded a median of $100,000 in the no-anchor condition and
$150,000 in the anchor condition, while Republican judges awarded a median of
$25,000 in the no-anchor condition and $450,000 in the anchor condition. The main
effect of political orientation was not significant,'" but an interaction between the
anchoring condition and party affiliation was statistically significant.'
3. Discussion
References to damage caps affected the judges in our study. Telling judges not to
award more than the cap led them to award more than when no reference was made
to that cap. Because the Canadian judges were already aware of the existence of the
cap, the effect must have arisen from increasing its salience. Because the case is
worth so much less than the cap, the judges who were not reminded of it were likely
not thinking about it. But when the materials highlighted the cap, judges became
aware of the scale on which they were making their assessment. The cap made the
small award that they were considering seem paltry relative to the available range.

160.
161.
162.
were in

Fs < 1.00, p's > 0.5.
F's < 1.00, p's > 0.5.
Using the Mann-Whitney test, p <0.005. 7 judges did not respond; 4 of these judges
the no-anchor condition, and 3 were in the anchor condition.

163. F(l, 53) = 3.60, p = 0.06 and F(l, 53) = 3.60,p = 0.06. This analysis was conducted
on a square root of the awards, as the distribution of the awards was positively skewed.
164. F(l, 52) = 0.00, p > 0.5. This analysis was also conducted on the square root of the
awards.
165. F(1, 52) = 6.04,p <0.02.
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The mechanism by which we identified the anchor, however, could have
inadvertently signaled to the judges that the case might be worth more than they
otherwise would have thought. The anchoring effect occurred largely in the version
in which the defendant referred to the cap. The cap had less influence when the
plaintiff mentioned it and when the reference was unattributed. The defendant's
statement that the award could not exceed the cap might have implied that the
defendant feared that the case was worth much more than the cap. Although we
provided judges with most of the information about the nature of the injury that they
would have had in a real case, the materials are naturally somewhat less detailed. The
judges were also apt to have been less motivated to measure the plaintiff s damages
accurately than they would have been in a real case and might have been looking for
a simple cue to approximate its value. Therefore, the defendant's reminder might
have led the judges to assume that the injuries were more serious than they otherwise
would have thought. The plaintiff's reminder, on the other hand, might have seemed
self-interested and thus less credible than the defendant's, so it understandably had
less influence on the judges.
Nevertheless, we believe that, as a normative matter, the judges should not have
been influenced by any reference to the damage cap, regardless of its source. The
facts provided the judges with enough information to determine an appropriate award
without relying on an offhand remark. We believe that the results reflect an
unfortunate influence of anchoring.
C Study 3: OrderEffects

The order or sequence in which information is learned or tasks are performed can
alter judgment.166 The sequence in which a judge sentences offenders provides
another possible source of misleading anchors. Just as Frederick and Mochon found
that the order in which subjects estimated the average weight of animals affected
their judgments,1 67 so too might the order in which judges assign sentences affect the
relative length of their sentences. 168 A short sentence for a minor offense might serve
as an anchor that shortens a subsequent sentence imposed for a more serious crime.
Similarly, a long sentence imposed for a more serious crime might serve as an anchor
that lengthens a subsequent sentence assigned to a less serious crime. Such a result
would provide convincing evidence that anchors influence judgment even when they
are wholly irrelevant. Obviously, a sentence assigned to an unrelated defendant for

166. See S. E. Asch, Forming Impressions of Personality, 41 J. ABNORMAL & Soc.
258, 271 (1946) (demonstrating that the sequence in which a person's traits are
revealed influences our perception of that person and explaining that "the first terms set up in
most subjects a direction which then exerts a continuous effect on the latter terms" (emphasis
omitted)); see also Birte Englich, Thomas Mussweiler & Fritz Strack, The Last Word in
PSYCHOL.

Court-A Hidden Disadvantagefor the Defense, 29

LAW

& HUMAN

BEHAv.

705 (2005)

(presenting evidence that defense attomeys might anchor their own recommendations on
prosecutors' recommendations, which are presented first).
167. Frederick & Mochon, supra note 61, at 126.
168. See Critcher & Gilovich, supranote 45, at 248 (concluding that "incidental numbers
present in the environment influenced participants' estimates of uncertain values").
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an unrelated crime provides a judge with no meaningful insight into the appropriate
sentence for a subsequent case.
Anchoring is not the only possible extraneous consequence of sentence order.
Judges might also suffer from a contrast effect. The contrast effect is the tendency to
base judgments on comparisons with similar examples even though the judgments
were intended to be independent.' The contrast effect produces the opposite result
from anchoring on the influence of serial judgments; anchoring suggests that the
initial judgment will pull the second closer, while the contrast effect suggests that the
first judgment will push the second further away.' 70
In our previous research on anchoring, we found anchoring effects rather than
contrast effects, but other research suggests that contrast effects might occur in some
circumstances. If contrast effects influence sentencing in judges, then reviewing a
minor crime might make a more serious crime seem even worse in contrast, thereby
producing a longer sentence for the more serious crime. Likewise, reviewing a
serious crime might make a minor crime seem even less serious, thereby producing
a shorter sentence for the less serious crime. Research by Kelman and his colleagues
has demonstrated the influence of the contrast effect and the influence of scaling in
lay assessments of criminal cases."' In their study, mock jurors were more likely to
sentence a hypothetical defendant to community service rather than jail if an
inadequate community service sentence was presented as a third option." 2 Other
research, however, has failed to uncover related contrast effects in similar
circumstances, 7 3 suggesting that the influence of contrast effects on assessments of
criminal cases is not a robust phenomenon.
One previous study suggests that sentence order influences judges. Research by
Danziger and his colleagues found that decisions made by an Israeli parole court
were different during different times of the day. 17' This court granted only 20% of
the applications for parole made immediately before lunch, but the success rate
soared to 60% for the first case after lunch. The success rate declined again in the
lead up to the court's afternoon break, and rose again after that break."' The

169. See Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky, Choice in Context: Tradeoff Contrast and
Extremeness Aversion, 29 J. MARKETING REs. 281, 281 (1992) ("Contrast effects are
ubiquitous in perception and judgment."); see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich
& Chris Guthrie, AlteringAttention in Adjudication, 60 UCLA L. REv. 1586, 1597-609 (2013)
(documenting the influence of contrast effects in judges). See generally Cass R. Sunstein,
Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade &Ilana Ritov, PredictablyIncoherentJudgments, 54 STAN.

L. REv. 1153 (2002) (describing research showing that people often make comparative
judgments about fault in legal settings, even when absolute judgments are required).
170. See Frederick & Mochon, supra note 61, at 127-28 ("[P]rior judgments can affect
respondents' interpretation of numeric labels even on objective scales.").
171. Mark Kelman, Yuval Rottenstreich & Amos Tversky, Context-Dependence in Legal
Decision Making, 25 J. LEGAL STuD. 287, 295-97 (1996).
172. Id. at 296-97.
173. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, The Cognitive Components of
Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 457,482 (2003) (finding that the data obtained in this study
"[did] not show evidence of contrast effects in decision making about the death penalty").
174. See generally Shai Danziger, Jonathan Levav & Liora Avnaim-Pesso, Extraneous
Factorsin JudicialDecisions, 108 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SC. 6889 (2011).
175. Id.
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researchers interpret these results as evidence that the judges grew hungry or tired,
encouraging the somewhat easier decision to deny parole (most applicants are
denied).176 The researchers also provide an alternative account, however, suggesting
that the judges had an implicit quota for each day;1 17 having granted parole in a
number of cases, the judges had to become stingy so as not to exceed their quota as
the day progressed. Others have argued, however, that the order in which the Israeli
parole board hears cases is not truly random.' 78
The impact of sentence order thus remains uncertain. Judges might be subject to
anchoring or contrast effects or might resist any such influence. A sentence-order
effect would be pernicious because each defendant is entitled to be sentenced
according to the merits of his or her own case. To ascertain-whether judges resist this
influence, we undertook a study of case order.
1. Methods and Materials
We studied the effect of case order with three different groups of judges: newly
appointed military judges, 179 judges attending the annual Arizona Judicial
Conference in 2011,18s and Dutch judges attending a conference sponsored by the
Dutch Judicial Council in the Netherlands.'"' Each of these three groups assessed a
similar pair of hypothetical cases. One of the cases consisted of an assault or a similar
battery. We intended this case to constitute the less serious crime. The second case
consisted of a voluntary manslaughter similar to that used in Study 1, which produced
an average sentence of 9.7 years The materials provided the judges with the
following information: "Assume that your court calendar this morning includes the
sentencing of two defendants: Jones and Smith. Both cases arise from separate
incidents, but both have pled guilty." Half of the judges reviewed the less serious
crime first, and the other half reviewed the more serious crime first.

176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See Keren Weinshall-Margel & John Shapard, Overlooked Factorsin the Analysis of
ParoleDecision, 108 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. E833, E833 (2011) (arguing "[t]he phenomenon
of favorable decisions peaking after a meal break is likely an artifact of the order of case
presentation" and contending that such breaks are not random).
179. These judges were nearing the completion of a training course for newly assigned trial
judges, and hence were inexperienced judges. As part of their training, they were required to
participate in a session identified as reviewing "judicial decision making." For these judges,
completing the survey was compulsory (and indeed, the response rate was 100%), although
each judge was afforded the option of withdrawing his or her survey from further analysis
(anonymously). The survey was presented at both the 2010 and 2011 sessions of this
conference, and the results were aggregated for analysis.
180. The Arizona Judicial Conference is an annual conference attended by most of the
judges in Arizona. The data come from a breakout session entitled, "How Judges Think,"
which was optional for the judges attending the conference.
181. This was a day-long conference sponsored by the Dutch Judicial Council and was
optional for the judges. The conference was entitled, "Judgment Day," and the materials for

this conference were translated into Dutch.
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a. Military Materials
Although we used the same fact pattern for the severe crime in all three groups,
the less severe crime varied to suit the jurisdiction. For the military judges, the less
severe crime consisted of threatening with an unloaded weapon. The facts were as
follows:
Jones pled guilty to simple assault with an unloaded firearm; as part
of an agreement, he would not be prosecuted for any other crime related
to this incident. The act occurred when Jones got into a loud argument
with another service member while on the base at which they were both
stationed. The source of the argument is unclear, but may have involved
an accusation by Jones that the service member owed him some money.
Jones walked away from the argument only to return a few minutes later
with a service pistol. He pointed the pistol at the service member and
threatened to shoot him if he did not pay. At a moment of inattention,
bystanders wrestled Jones to the ground and removed the pistol, which
was not loaded. Jones asserts that he checked to ensure that the weapon
was not loaded before he pointed it at the service member.
Jones is 19 and has served for 6 months. He has not had any other
disciplinary problems. His service record is otherwise unremarkable to
date. He has agreed to accept a dishonorable discharge, and the only
remaining issue is the length of confinement. Simple assault with an
unloaded weapon carries a maximum sentence of 3 years of confinement.
For the militaryjudges, the more severe crime remained involuntary manslaughter
and involved another service member. The materials also indicated that this
defendant had pled guilty and agreed to a dishonorable discharge. Involuntary
manslaughter carries a maximum sentence of 15 years in the military justice system.
The materials provided the following background about the defendant:
Smith is 23 years old and has served for over three years. He has been
reprimanded once in the past for an incident arising from a bar fight while
he was intoxicated. His service record is otherwise clean, but
unremarkable. He served for 18 months in Afghanistan with his unit.
Sentencing in a military court-martial is not conducted entirely by the trial
judge.' 82 Both the jury and the judge independently recommend a sentence. The
judge then recommends the less severe of the two sentences to the general in
command of the unit, who may depart from the recommendation either upward or
downward. In the case of the military judges, we were thus studying an important
sentence recommendation, rather than the sentence actually imposed.
We did not ask the military judges for political affiliation. We did not ask for their
experience as judges either because all were new to the position; but all had
significant experience in the military.' We asked their gender, but because only 17

182. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES, A21, at 72 (2012) ("Sentencing
in courts-martial may be by the military judge or members.").
183. The judges had an average of 18.7 years of experience in the military (the median was
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of the judges (24%) were female, we did not analyze gender differences for these
judges. A total of 71 military judges completed the sentencing questions:184 35 in
2010 and 40 in 2011.
b. Arizona Materials
The materials for the Arizona judges were similar to those used with the military
judges, although the less severe crime differed slightly. Because the analogous crime
in Arizona is punished much more severely, we had to eliminate the use of the
firearm and substitute conduct that would still draw a similar range of sentences.185
The facts we used are described below:
Jones pled guilty to aggravated assault under A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(5)
(assault that occurs in the private home of the victim). The incident
occurred when Jones got into a loud argument with a coworker while the
two were leaving their workplace (an office) at the end of the day. The
source of the argument involved an accusation by Jones that his coworker
owed him some money. Jones apparently followed the coworker home,
waited until the coworker unlocked the door, and pushed him inside.
Jones, who is several inches taller than his coworker, shoved the victim
around inside his living room and threatened to "beat him badly" if he
did not pay. A neighbor overheard the shouting, and called the police,
who arrived quickly and arrested Jones. Jones asserts that he did not
intend to hurt his victim, and only wanted the money he was owed.
Nevertheless, the victim suffered a mild concussion.
We also varied the defendant's background slightly to avoid references to his
military record:
Jones is 19, unmarried, and has no previous arrests. He was employed
as a full-time administrative assistant until the incident and was living on
his own in an apartment. His parents both testified at his hearing that he
had never been in trouble before. His mother stated that she felt that Jones
was worried about money because his company had been threatening to
close his office and lay everyone off.
In Arizona, the judge assigned to the case imposes the sentence. Arizona,
however, has somewhat more elaborate substantive restrictions in the form of limited
maximum and minimum sentences and a presumptive sentence. In Arizona, the

18 years).
184. Due to an error in creating the surveys in 2011, 4 judges sentenced only the
manslaughter defendant. These judges were kept in the analysis among judges who sentenced
the manslaughter defendant first, but they provided no data on the threat.
185. The same crime in Arizona would constitute aggravated assault with a deadly weapon,
which is a class 3 felony. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1204(A)(2) (2010). It carries a
presumptive sentence of 3.5 years. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-702(D) (2010). In light of this
fact, we changed the crime to an assault that occurs in the private home of the victim.
§ 13-1204(A)(5).
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As the materials noted, "[fJor first time-offenders

with no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, it carries a minimum sentence of
87
0.5 years, a maximum of 1.5 years, and a presumptive sentence of I year."'
The circumstances of the voluntary manslaughter were identical to those in Study
1, above. In Arizona, this crime would be a class 2 felony, 8 8 which, for this
defendant's background, would carry a minimum sentence of 7 years, a maximum
89
of21 years, and a presumptive sentence of 10.5 years.1
A total of 39 Arizona judges completed the survey. These judges had an average
of 11.5 years of experience as judges (a median of 9.5 years), ranging from 0 to 35
years (only 37 reported their experience). Of the 38 who reported their gender, 15

(39%) were female. Of the 37 judges who reported their political affiliation, 18 (46%)

9 0 The group
identified themselves as Republicans and 19 (54%) as Democrats.'
included 8 appellate judges (out of 38 who responded to the demographic page-we
assumed the individual who did not complete the demographic questions was also a
judge), who were included in the analysis.

c. Dutch Materials
The materials for the Dutch judges were identical to those of the Arizona judges
in terms of their facts. We changed the names of the defendants to Jasperen and
Smulders instead of Jones and Smith, respectively. We also anticipated that many of
the Dutch judges would insist upon a suspended sentence for the lesser crime, so we
offered them that option. For both the less severe and more severe crimes, the Dutch
judges could impose a suspended sentence, a sentence to be served, or both.
A total of 62 Dutchjudges completed the questions on sentencing.' 9' These judges
had an average of 13.2 years of experience as judges (a median of 12 years), ranging
from just under 1 year to 27 years. Of the 62 who reported their gender, 23 (3 9%)
were female. We did not ask the Dutch judges questions concerning their political
affiliation. The sample included 17 appellate judges (including 3 judges from the
High Court).
2. Results
a. Military Judges
The order of sentence influenced the military judges. Table 3a, below, presents
the average sentence in each condition. Judges who sentenced the manslaughter

186. § 13-1204(D) ("Aggravated assault pursuant to subsection A, paragraph ... 5 ... is a
class 6 felony.").
187. See § 13-702 (D).
188. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103(C)(2010).
189. See§ 13-702 (D).
190. Twenty-three judges identified themselves as independent, unaffiliated, or simply did
not respond to our question about political affiliation: "Which of the two major political parties
in the United States most closely matches your own political beliefs?"
191. Sixty-three judges were in attendance at the conference; only I did not complete the
sentencing questions.
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case first provided longer sentences than the judges who sentenced the threat first
(1.61 years versus 1.15 years). Likewise, judges who sentenced the threat first
provided shorter sentences than judges who sentenced the manslaughter first (6.65
years versus 8.52 years). Both effects were statistically significant.' 9 2 The result is
consistent with an anchoring effect. The first sentence effectively acted as an
anchor for the judges, even though the cases were clearly labeled as independent
crimes.
Table 3a. Mean sentence by condition among military judges
Crime

Threat
Manslaughter

First crime: mean sentence (and n)

Test of difference

Threat

Manslaughter

t-statistic

p-value

1.15 (31)
6.65 (31)

1.61 (40)
8.52 (44)

2.65
2.46

0.01
0.02

b. Arizona Judges
Sentencing order influenced the Arizona judges, albeit in a more limited way.
Table 3b, below, presents the average sentence in each condition. As was the case
with the military judges, Arizona judges who sentenced the manslaughter case first
provided longer sentences than the judges who sentenced the threat first (0.82 years
versus 0.56 years); this difference was statistically significant. Assigning the
lengthy sentence to the manslaughter defendant seemed to anchor the judges,
biasing their sentences for the less severe crime. We did not observe a similar effect
on the manslaughter sentences, however. Judges provided virtually identical
sentences for manslaughter, regardless of which defendant they sentenced first.
Owing to the relatively small sample size, we did not assess the influence of the
demographic variables.
Table 3b. Mean sentence by condition among Arizona judges
Crime

Battery
Manslaughter

First crime: mean sentence (and n)

Test of difference

Battery

Manslaughter

t-statistic

p-value

0.56(18)
9.06 (18)

0.82(21)
9.12 (21)

2.13
0.12

0.04
0.91

c. Dutch Judges
Table 3c, below, presents the average sentence in each condition. Despite
differences between the two types of judges and the jurisdictions, the results are
comparable to those of the Arizona judges. The order influenced the sentences judges
assigned to the less serious crime but not to the more serious crime.

192. We report the statistical test results in the Tables for this study.
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Table 3c. Mean sentence by condition among Dutch judges

Crime

Sentence type
(and n)

Condition

Test of difference

Battery
(1st)

Manslaughter
(1st)

tstatistic

pvalue

Battery

Unconditional (62)
Conditional (62)
Total (62)

0.05
0.09
0.14

0.24
0.52
0.76

1.98
3.20
3.71

0.05'
0.002*
0.0004'

Manslaughter

Unconditional (62)
Conditional (62)
Total (62)

5.13
0.66
5.79

5.43
1.03
6.46

0.49
0.96
1.05

0.62
0.34
0.31

*Statistically significant
3. Discussion
Sentence order influenced the judges. Even though the cases clearly had nothing
to do with each other, sentencing one defendant influenced the sentencing of the
next. Sentencing a defendant to roughly 1 year in prison made a lengthy sentence
seem excessive to the judges, even though the second case was a serious one.
Additionally, sentencing a defendant to a lengthy sentence made a short sentence
seem too short by comparison. We saw no evidence of the contrast effect. Instead,
anchoring prevailed.
The effect was more pronounced on the less serious case than the more serious
one. In all three versions, sentencing the more serious crime first raised the sentence
of the less serious crime, but the more serious crime was unaffected in two of the
three variations. We are not certain why this occurred. Possibly, the judges felt that
they had more discretion to raise the somewhat short sentence for the less serious
crime than they had to lower the sentence for the more serious crime.1 93
Because the two crimes are independent, it is hard to see how they could have
provided relevant information about each other. Perhaps judges assumed that, despite
our assertion to the contrary, crimes tend to be batched together in terms of severity.
We think not, however. Judges are certainly used to the idea that different unrelated
cases appear before them in the same session. The most plausible account of the
results is anchoring.
D. Study 4: Debiasing
In experiment after experiment, we find that judges rely on numeric anchors, even
when doing so is normatively indefensible. In some studies, one might be able to
identify an appropriate reason to rely on the numeric reference point, but the weight
of evidence across the preceding studies (as well as the experiments on anchoring in

193. See also Bushway et al., supra note 98, at 298 (suggesting that anchoring might be
more effective at increasing sentences than decreasing sentences).
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judges that we have previously reported elsewhere) suggests that anchors distort
judges' judgment.1 94 In particular, the pattern of results is most consistent with the
account of anchoring developed by Frederick and Mochon.195 That is, numeric
reference points distort judges' sense of scale. As an example, less serious injuries
do not necessarily seem more serious when judges learn of (relatively) high damage
caps, but their sense of where the injury fits on the scale is affected.
This account of anchoring suggests a mechanism for producing judgments that
are less heavily affected by anchoring. If anchoring distorts judges' sense of scale,
then reliable judgments depend upon establishing a reliable sense of scale. In civil
cases, giving judges a reliable sense of how to convert injuries into dollars might
ameliorate the influence of anchors.
1. Methods and Materials
To determine whether providing a reliable scale can thwart the influence of
anchors, we asked 242 judges attending a statewide judicial conference in Ohio to
assess a case involving a serious personal injury. These judges had an average of
14.2 years of experience, ranging from newly appointed to 42 years of judicial
service, with a median of 14 years. Of the 239 judges who informed us of their
gender, 20% were female. Of the 224 judges who answered our question concerning
political orientation, 62% were Republicans and 38% were Democrats.
We constructed six conditions to induce an anchoring effect and then inoculate
the judges against its influence. One-third of the judges evaluated a scenario in
which we requested a damage award but provided no anchor; one-third of the
judges evaluated the same scenario with a low anchor; and one-third of the judges
evaluated the same scenario with a high anchor. We also created a variation in
which judges reviewed a discussion of a newspaper article describing three
reasonable damage awards in other cases. We wanted to test whether reviewing
this article would serve as a kind of inoculant that would reduce the influence of
the anchors. Thus, half of the judges also reviewed this inoculant, thereby creating
a 3 x 2 between-subjects design (low anchor, no anchor, or high anchor crossed
with either no inoculant or inoculant).
The injury was one we used in our original experiment on anchoring with federal
magistrate judges. We described the plaintiff as a 31 -year-old school teacher and the
defendant as a large package-delivery service. The materials indicated that the
defendant's employee had been driving one of its trucks erratically and had
sideswiped the plaintiff. The defendant had admitted liability, and the parties had
settled economic claims and medical expenses, leaving only the noneconomic
damages unresolved. The materials described the injury as follows:
As a result of the accident, the plaintiff broke three ribs and severely
injured his right arm. He spent a week in the hospital and missed six

194. See, e.g., Guthrie et al., supra note 6, at 790-94; Wistrich et al., supra note 82, at
1291-93.

195. Frederick & Mochon, supra note 61, at 124 ("[O]ur theory of scale distortion suggests
that anchoring effects may also occur because of a shift in the use of the response scale itself and
not because of any deeper change in the underlying representation of the target being judged.").
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weeks of work. The injuries to his right arm were so severe as to require
amputation. (He was right-handed.)
The evidence presented at trial included testimony from the
plaintiff, a young father, that he could no longer play recreational
softball, or even play catch with his son. Although the plaintiff has
continued teaching, he testified that doing his job is somewhat more
difficult, and that he is subject to periodic ridicule by the students.
Plaintiff also described the severe pain he endured before arriving at
the hospital, during the surgery to amputate his arm, and during his
post-surgical therapy.
The materials created variations for the anchoring conditions by using the
manipulation we used in a previous study involving administrative law judges.1 96
That is, we inserted a statement by the plaintiff into the materials. For the low-anchor
condition, this statement read as follows: "During his testimony, the plaintiff also
mentioned as an aside that he recently saw a case on a 'court television show' where
'a victim like me' received a '$150,000 award.' You sustained the defendant's
objection to this comment as irrelevant." The high-anchor condition was identical,
except that it stated the amount as $10 million. The no-anchor condition included the
same statement, but omitted the dollar amount. For all judges, the materials ended
by asking: "How much would you award the plaintiff in this case for pain and
suffering and loss of his right arm?"
The inoculant consisted of the following additional paragraph inserted after the
reference to the plaintiff's testimony and before the call of the question:
The case reminds you of a recent legal newspaper article discussing
damage awards upheld on appeal in personal injury cases in Ohio,
including: a $214,000 award for a plaintiff who had lost a thumb in a
railroad accident; a $1,050,000 award for a plaintiff who had suffered
crippling back pain and an amputated leg from a car accident; and an
$11,000,000 award for a 24 year-old-plaintiff whose injuries made him
a quadriplegic with severe brain damage.
We hypothesized that the inoculant would negate the effect of the anchoring by
giving the judges a reasonable sense of how a variety of personal injury cases with
varying awards might translate into dollar amounts.
2. Results
Of the 242 judges, 226 provided a damage award.' Table 4, below, reports the
results.

196. Guthrie et al., supra note 78, at 1502-03.
197. The missing data were distributed fairly evenly through all six cells of the 3 x 2 design:
3 in the no-inoculant, low-anchor condition; 4 in the no-inoculant, no-anchor condition; 3 in
the no-inoculant, high-anchor condition; 2 in the inoculant, low-anchor condition; 3 in the
inoculant, no-anchor condition; and I in the inoculant, high-anchor condition.
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Table 4. Mean, 25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile of awards by condition
Anchor
(and n)

Mean

25th
percentile

Median

75th
percentile

No

Low (35)
No (36)
High (34)

741
1278
1483

225
325
500

500
750
1000

750
1250
2000

Inoculant

Low (42)
No (37)
High (42)

1079
1828
1841

500
750
500

750
1000
1000

1000
2500
2000

Inoculant?

Statistical tests to assess these effects were made challenging by the highly skewed
nature of the awards. Although a square root transformation produced a distribution
that more closely approximated a normal distribution, it was still somewhat skewed.
We thus conducted both an analysis of the medians, which is robust to outliers and
skewed data, and an analysis of the square root of the awards. In both cases, we
regressed awards against a dummy variable for the low-anchor condition; a dummy
variable for the high-anchor condition; a dummy variable for the inoculant conditions;
and two interaction terms between the variables for the low anchor, high anchor, and
inoculant. We report the regression results in Table 5, below.
Table 5. Regression results for median quantile regression and linear regression on the square
root of damage awards (in thousands)

Constant
Low anchor
High anchor
Inoculant
Low x
inoculant
High x
inoculant

Model 2: Square root

Model 1: Median regression
t-

p-

t-

p-

coefficient

statistic

value

coefficient

statistic

value

750
-250
250
250

3.26
3.33
3.21

0.001
0.001
0.002

976
-263
111
235

1.97
0.83
1.79

0

0.00

1.000

-17

0.09

0.93

-250

2.40

0.020

-129

0.70

0.49

-

Variable

0.05
0.41
0.09

The analysis produced a complex pattern of results. The medians shifted in ways
that we expected. That is, exposure to the low anchor lowered the median by
$250,000, and exposure to the high anchor raised the median by $250,000. The
inoculant had no effect on the influence of the low anchor, but it reduced the
influence of the high anchor. At the same time, the inoculant increased the median
damage award. The transformed data, however, show a somewhat different pattern.
These results suggest that the low anchor influenced the judges' awards, but the high
anchor did not. A nonparametric analysis of the comparison between the no-anchor
and the high-anchor condition did not produce a significant result.198 The inoculant

198. Using the Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.37.
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increased awards overall and did not eliminate the influence of the low anchor.
Because there was no significant effect of the high anchor, the inoculant could not
eliminate the influence of the high anchor.
Female judges were more generous than male judges. They provided an overall
median award of $1,000,000, as compared to a median of $750,000 among male
judges. This was a marginally statistically significant difference.'I" Democratic judges
provided a median award of $1,000,000, as compared to a median of $750,000 among
Republican judges, although this difference was not statistically significant.2 00 Years
of experience did not significantly correlate with award size.2 01 None of the
demographic variables interacted significantly with the influence of the anchor.2 02
3. Discussion
The results suggest that judges find it challenging to convert injuries into awards
without being influenced by anchoring. Our effort to reduce anchoring by providing
an inoculant was, at best, only partly successful. The inoculant had no apparent effect
on the low anchor, although it produced median awards that were identical in the
high-anchor and no-anchor conditions. The analysis of the transformed data and the
nonparametric analysis, however, suggest that the high anchor had little or no effect
on the overall distribution of awards (even though the median award was higher in
the high-anchor condition). Furthermore, the inoculant did not eliminate the effect of
the low anchor. The inoculant also had the unintended effect of increasing the size
of awards. Therefore, although exposing judges to sensible numeric reference points
might aid their judgment and diminish the distortion of anchoring, such an approach
would have to be more carefully tailored and might have unintended consequences.
Some have suggested that case-specific anchors may influence judges less than
jurors because judges may possess contextual or comparative information about
damage awards that jurors lack. 203 Assuming that such a disparity in
non-case-specific information exists, it may not be very helpful. First, our
experiments as a whole suggest that despite their arguably broader exposure to a
range of non-case-specific damage awards, judges are nevertheless powerfully
influenced by case-specific anchors. Second, the results of Study 4 indicate that
contextual or comparative information can itself distort damage awards. The ability
of non-case-specific information to reduce distortions caused by anchoring may
depend on the quality of that information and the manner in which it is presented.

199. Using the Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.06.
200. Using the Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.15.
201. r = .07 (using the square root of the awards), t(223)= 1.09,p = 0.27.
202. This was assessed by regressing the square root of the awards on the dummy variables
denoting the low- and high-anchor conditions, the three demographic variables (gender, party,
and years of experience), and the interaction terms. All t statistics for the coefficients for the
interaction terms were less than 1.0, and all p-values were greater than 0.25.
203. Hans & Reyna, supra note 96, at 144 ("[Alnchors presented during trial should have
a stronger impact on jury assessments than on judge assessments because judges are apt to
have contextual and comparative information about other cases that may counteract or
outweigh the impact of anchors presented during trial.").
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IV. IMPLICATIONS

Anchoring is a heuristic that profoundly distorts numerical estimates in a variety
of settings. As this study-e specially taken together with our previous experiments
on the topic-confirms, American, Canadian, and Dutch judges are not immune.
Although some of the anchors in these studies arguably had some relevance to the
underlying case, even hopelessly arbitrary anchors affected the decisions of the judges
we studied. Without remediation, damage awards and criminal sentences might.
Remedying the untoward influences of anchors is not an easy task. We tested a
plausible strategy for overcoming anchoring by embedding an anchor among a set of
other potential anchors, but the result was not entirely effective. Other studies suggest
that merely warning people about anchors also does little to avoid their effects. 2 0
What, then, might be done to minimize or eliminate the impact of irrelevant anchors?
In previous articles, we suggested steps that might be taken to minimize the
distortion caused by anchoring. These included attempting to train judges to avoid
the impact of anchoring, 205 prohibiting litigants from rmentioningsumbers-thatrmight
operate as anchors (such as a damage cap or plaintiffs ad damnum),2 06 separating
decision-making functions, 207 requiring explanations for the amount of damages
awarded or the sentence imposed, 208 relying on aggregated data, 20 9 and cabining
211
discretion with sentencing guidelines21 o and damage schedules.
Unless further research uncovers a better inoculant strategy than the one we used
in this study, minimizing the effect of anchors requires either (1) avoiding them,
(2) facilitating exposure to meaningful anchors, or (3) restricting judges' discretion
in imposing sentences or damages.
Prohibiting the mention of figures that might serve as anchors seems a promising
strategy. Some jurisdictions have adopted it. 212 A separation of decision-making
functions serves the same purpose indirectly by ensuring that if an anchor is mentioned
to a judge acting as a case manager, settlement officer, or evidence gatekeeper, a

204. Guthrie et al., supra note 78, at 1505-06.
205. Guthrie et al., supra note 32, at 38-40.
206. See Kang, supra note 149, at 493; see also 43 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(2) (2012)
(prohibiting mention of damage caps to juries in employment discrimination cases). But see
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Matthew T. Brodie, The Effects of Jury Ignorance About
Damage Caps: The Case of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 90 IOWA L. REv. 1361, 1404 (2005)
(arguing that "concealing the cap has the potential to undermine the integrity and legitimacy
of the jury system" and advocating as an alternative remedy "provid[ing] juries with more
complete knowledge of caps and their context").
207. Guthrie et al., supra note 32 at 42; Wistrich et al., supra note 82, at 1325-27.
208. Guthrie et al., supra note 32, at 36-38; Guthrie et al., supra note 78, at 1501, 1504-06.
209. Guthrie et al., supra note 6, at 823.
210. Id. at 794.
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., Reese v. Hersey, 29 A. 907, 908 (Pa. 1894); Porter v. Zenger Milk Co., 7
A.2d 77, 78 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1939); see also EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 276 F.R.D. 637,
639-40 (E.D. Wash. 2011) ("[I]f Plaintiff intends to suggest a specific amount to the jury for
emotional distress damages, yet fails to supplement its Rule 26 disclosures to provide
Defendant with a computation of damages, Plaintiff may be foreclosed from suggesting that
specific amount for emotional distress damages to the jury at trial.").
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different judge or a jury acting as the fact finder will be shielded from exposure to it.
Some of the experiments reported in this Article (particularly Study 3), however,
suggest that this approach may be too limited. Anchors can arise from contextual
sources perhaps too numerous and varied to be effectively controlled in this way.213
Mechanisms to facilitate exposure to meaningful anchors might be promising.
The legal system includes numerous meaningful, sensible anchors. As the research
demonstrates, for example, recommendations from prosecutors and defense
attorneys influence judges. 214 If these actors make sensible recommendations, then
the judges will find them to be stabilizing influences. 215 Although parties might abuse
the insights in this Article to make outrageous requests, 216 lawyers' suggestions as to
sentences or awards might make for more reliable awards and sentences when both
parties suggest them. Competing anchors are apt to stabilize awards and sentences. 217
Furthermore, knowing that an adversary will suggest an award or sentence might
discipline each party into making reasonable suggestions. In civil cases, judges could
facilitate this by obtaining competing suggestions in the context of settlement
discussions and permitting bifurcation to allow a defense attorney to suggest an
anchor without admitting liability.218
Controlling discretion with sentencing guidelines and damage schedules also can
minimize anchoring effects. The former are common, 219 and the latter are gradually
gaining acceptance.220 Guidelines and schedules are not likely to eliminate the

213. See Critcher & Gilovich, supra note 45, at 248 (reporting that "incidental numbers
present in the environment influenced participants' estimates of uncertain values").
214. See Englich & Mussweiler, supra note 94, at 1547-49.

215. Lawyers, however, are not immune to the influence of anchoring either; actors might
anchor on each other. One study suggests that defense attorneys who make their
recommendations after prosecutors might adjust their recommendations toward those offered
by the prosecutor. See generally Englich et al., supra note 166.
216. See Don Rushing, Linda Lane & Erin Bosman, Anchors Away: Attacking Dollar
Suggestionsfor Non-EconomicDamages in Closings, 70 DEF. COUNSEL J. 378, 379-81 (2003).
217. Studies in which multiple anchors are available suggest that counteranchors might be
effective. See generally Glen Whyte & James K. Sebenius, The Effect ofMultiple Anchors on
Anchoringin IndividualandGroup Judgment, 69 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSEs 75 (1997). One study in a legal setting in which researchers used competing
anchors, unfortunately, did not compare versions in which the defendant did not offer an
anchor to ones in which the defendant did offer one. Malouff & Schutte, supra note 69, at
493-96. A more recent study suggests that defense attorneys can blunt the anchoring effect of
a plaintiffs demand by offering a counteranchor, although doing so might also increase the
defendant's chances of being found liable. John Campbell, Bernard Chao, Christopher
Robertson & David Yokum, Counteringthe PlaintifsAnchor: Jury Simulations To Evaluate
DamagesArguments (Arizona Legal Studies, Discussion Paper No. 14-25, 2014), availableat
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2470066.
218. See Randy Wilson, Do You Suggest a Number?, ADVOCATE, Winter 2011, at 107, 107
("The defense attorney is in ... a quandary. To suggest ... anything might be perceived as a
concession of liability.").
219. See generallyNAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 130.
220. See, e.g., Arpin v. United States, 521 F.3d 769, 776 (7th Cir. 2008) (reversing an
award of damages for loss of consortium and directing the trial court to determine the average
ratio of loss-of-consortium damages because the trial court failed to consider awards in similar
cases); Geressy v. Digital Equip. Corp., 980 F. Supp. 640, 635, 654-62 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
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distortion caused by anchoring, but these efforts will reduce the variability of these
judgments by constraining their range. 22 1 Such guidelines themselves might also act
as anchors, although judges could minimize their influence by first assessing
qualitative factors and only consulting the guidelines after identifying a tentative
sentence. 222 Many such existing devices, however, may leave too much room for
discretion and hence for distortion. There is, for example, a continuum of strictness
along which the states employing sentencing guidelines may be arrayed. 223 Those
that are most strict may still permit some individualization and thereby also permit
some distortion but may confine the latter within acceptable bounds. 224 States with
more relaxed guidelines, on the other hand, might tolerate too much distortion. The
post-Booker225 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines may fall nearer the relaxed end of the
continuum than those of some states, such as Minnesota. 226 A similar continuum
exists with respect to damage schedules. 227

-

_

7jdetermiiiing whetheradamage award "deviated mateifallyfrom what would be reasonable
compensation" by comparing it to previous awards in similar cases (citation omitted)). See
also Oscar G. Chase, HelpingJurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 763, 775-76 (1995) (suggesting that jurors be provided with a chart summarizing damage
awards in cases involving similarly situated plaintiffs); Shari Seidman Diamond, Michael J.
Saks & Stephan Landsman, Juror Judgments About Liability and Damages: Sources of
Variability and Ways To Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REv. 301, 321-22 (1998)

(advocating that attorneys be permitted, albeit with judicial supervision, to present to the jury
a set of damage awards made by previous juries in similar cases); Roselle L. Wissler, Allen J.
Hart & Michael J. Saks, DecisionmakingAbout GeneralDamages: A Comparison ofJurors,
Judges, and Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REv. 751, 817 (1999) (recommending that parties or the
court "pool jury awards made for similar injuries, and ... present these cases and their award
distributions to juries for guidance in reaching their general damages awards").
221. See Rachlinski et al., supra note 86, at 1236-37.
222. Judge Mark Bennett has suggested this procedure. See Bennett, supranote 74, at 530
("I suggest that the sentencing judge should review and study the information in a PSR's
non-Guidelines § 3553(a) first.").
223. See generallyNAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 130.

224. See Sanders, supra note 142, at 149 ("Here we face a tradeoff. The proposals that are
likely to have the greatest impact in reducing horizontal inequity are the ones that most clearly
limit jury discretion, and those that leave the most discretion in the hands of jurors are likely
to leave the most residual inequities.").
225. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (concluding that the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines are "effectively advisory").
226. See generally Mustard, supra note 19 (noting that race and gender disparities persist
despite sentencing guidelines); Lydia Brashear Tiede, Disparity in Federal District Court

Sentencing, LAW & CTS. (Am. Political Sci. Ass'n, Columbia, S.C.), Summer 2012, at 29, 32
("[I]n several of the circuits, judges chose to sentence within the Guideline ranges over 70%
of the time, while in other circuits ... judges stayed within the Guideline ranges for only 35%
of the cases. Further, in several other circuits ... judges stayed within the federally mandated
Guidelines less than 50% of the time.").
227. See Sanders, supra note 142, at 145 (distinguishing between "proposals ... that would
restrict juries to a range of general damage amounts and those that only wish to give juries
guidance without any real constraint on their ultimate decision"); see also Joseph Sanders, Why
Do ProposalsDesigned To Control Variability in General Damages (Generally) Fall on Deaf

Ears? (And Why This Is Too Bad), 55 DEPAuL L. REv. 489,496-507 (2006) (summarizing various
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CONCLUSION

One of the defining characteristics of the justice system is that its outputs are
frequently expressed in numbers. The amount of bail to be posted to obtain pretrial
release, the length of a sentence to be served, the amount of compensatory or
exemplary damages to be paid-all require quantification. Sometimes determining
the right number is easy, such as when there is a fixed bail schedule, a precisely
prescribed sentence, a liquidated damages clause, or a claim for medical expenses
that can be calculated by simply tallying the doctors' bills. In an appreciable
percentage of cases, however, quantification is necessary, but not so simple. This is
the realm-the amount of damages for pain and suffering, the duration of discretionary
sentences, and so on-in which anchors can and, as we have shown, do have a
distorting, and sometimes dramatic, impact. Because anchoring is a powerful
phenomenon, reducing its influence will not be easy. Although we have experimented
with debiasing techniques, we have yet to find one that is unqualifiedly successful.
As we have previously suggested, the only reliable solution might be to confine
judicial discretion with relatively tight sentencing guidelines and workers'
compensation-like damages schedules.228 Of course, adopting such solutions entails
costs. The solutions would reduce individualization229 and could prove dispiriting to
judges who might feel that they have been relegated to serving as calculating
machines. Is defeating anchoring worth the costs of adopting such measures? That is
a question policymakers should consider if they want to avoid arbitrariness in judges'
criminal sentences and civil damage awards.

scheduling proposals); Studdert et al., supra note 7, at 81 tbl.1 (summarizing the strengths and
weaknesses of various options for scheduling noneconomic damages).
228. See Wistrich et al., supra note 82, at 1328-29.

&

229. See Richard Abel, General Damages Are Incoherent, Incalculable,
Incommensurable, and Inegalitarian(But Otherwise a Great Idea), 55 DEPAUL L. REv. 253,
296 (2006) ("All schedules . . . impose slot-machine justice, sacrificing nuance and
individualization to convenience."); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The Tragedy in Torts,
5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 139, 172 (1996) ("It should be noted that recent proposals to
provide jurors with guidelines or schedules for general damages are inconsistent with
traditional rules concerning general damages. The proposals would abstract away from the
particular plaintiff." (footnote omitted)). But see Murray B. Rutherford, Jack L. Knetsch
Thomas C. Brown, Assessing EnvironmentalLosses: Judgments ofImportance and Damage
Schedules, 22 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 51, 101 (1998) ("[A] damage schedule would necessarily
be somewhat arbitrary. However ... it might in practice be less arbitrary and more equitable
than ad hoc measurement."); Leandro M. Zanitelli, DeterminingPain-and-SufferingAwards
Accurately: General or Case-by-Case Law?, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 183, 214 (2009)

(concluding that "no greater accuracy is to be expected from case-by-case damage awarding
as compared to general rules").

